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Chapter One - Introduction
There is no greater gamble on earth than a British 
general election - James Middleton, 1936
The British electoral system is not a gamble...the 
relation between a party 1 s representation in Parliament and 
its support in the country is almost as predictable as it 
would be under proportional representation - David Butler, 
1953
I
One of the most widely discussed concepts in the study 
of voting and elections has been electoral bias. This thesis 
has two purposes. The first is to develop a number of meas­
ures of bias so as to avoid the defects inherent in those 
measures which have hitherto been in popular use. The second 
is to analyse the measures so developed from a critical 
viewpoint. ^
The term "bias" can be interpreted broadly or narrowly. 
In its broadest sense "bias" could encompass any aspect of 
the electoral process which advantages one or more candid­
ates or parties, such as, for example, the differential
2impact of informal voting, or of the "donkey vote". But the 
measures considered in this thesis are based on a much 
narrower perspective, which accepts the votes cast at an 
election as exogenous, and focuses upon the process by which 
those votes combine to produce a division of legislative
(2)
3seats. Henceforth "bias" will be regarded as the extent to 
which the relationship between seats and votes differs from
party to party. When "bias" is so defined, the political 
significance of its discovery is immediately clear. For a 
number of popular measures of bias, this is not the case. 
Johnston, for example, puts forward a measure based on 
Hacker's well-known classification of votes as "effective", 
"excess" or "wasted".^ However, a positive value of this 
measure does not by itself even imply that the proportion of 
seats which will be won with a given proportion of the total 
vote will vary from party to party. The principles of polit­
ical equality which are breached in such a situation remain 
vague and unspecified, and it is thus appropriate that our 
definition should exclude such measures.
Such an approach carries with it a recognition of the 
central role played by political parties in the legislative 
politics of most liberal democracies. In this thesis we 
consider only measures of bias against political parties 
(rather than including, if there be any, measures of bias 
against individual candidates). This approach can be defend­
ed on a number of different grounds.
From a theoretical standpoint, it can first be argued 
that an electoral system need not involve individual candid­
ates. Conceivably voters might be offered only a choice 
between two or more parties; this is true even in a case 
in which the polity is divided into constituencies. Such a 
state of affairs could arise, for example, if the U.S. 
Presidential electoral college were modified. Under the
(3)
current system, the people choose an electoral college, and 
the electors in that college choose the President. But the 
system could also work if the electors in the college were 
replaced by appropriate tokens, such as discs of different 
colours (or elephants and donkeys), which could be counted 
to determine the outcome of the election. This of course 
represents a polar situation in which the role of the indiv­
idual candidate is completely eliminated by institutional 
factors. The theoretical possibility of such a system makes 
it worthy of study in its own right.
Secondly it can be argued that where there are only 
single-member constituencies, it is meaningless to talk of 
bias against an individual candidate, since the concept of 
bias which we have adopted relates only to the relationship 
between the total proportion of the vote polled by a party 
and the total proportion of the seats which it wins, and 
since the outcome of the election in a specific seat is 
causally prior to, and logically independent of, both of 
these quantities. Under Australian electoral law, it is 
possible for a candidate to contest every seat in the legis­
lature. Under such circumstances, however, it is more 
appropriate for our purposes to regard him as a party 
(albeit a small one).
As well as these theoretical arguments, there is empir­
ical evidence in the Australian case to support an exclusive 
emphasis on the position of parties. A number of studies in 
Australia have made clear the extent to which voters iden­
tify themselves as supporters of a political party, and the
(4)
degree of influence which this has on the way in which they 
vote.^ These are complemented by a study which finds that in 
Australia the impact of the individual candidate on the out­
come of elections at the state and federal level has been
• • i 6minimal.
Some analysts have argued that the fate of political 
parties at elections is only of secondary importance, and 
have preferred to analyse the manner in which the electoral 
system takes account of the preferences of the individual 
voter.^ This approach, in deflecting attention from the 
fates of parties, takes insufficient account of the way in 
which parties have become the major routes of interest 
articulation for the great bulk of voters in many countries. 
Because of this trend, the distinction between the way in 
which the. system treats the voter and the way in which it 
treats his or her party is a somewhat artificial one.
Finally in defence of this approach, it should be 
pointed out that concentration on the fates of parties is a 
major feature of the substantial literature on electoral 
bias which already exists
Even with this restriction, our perspective is still 
too broad. It will be narrowed further by limiting consider­
ation to those electoral systems marked by single-member 
constituencies, and the plurality or preferential methods of 
scrutiny. In practice this is not very restrictive, since 
the electoral systems for the lower houses of the Australian 
Federal Parliament, the Australian Mainland State Parlia-g
ments, the New Zealand and British Parliaments, and the
(5)
U.S. Congress fall into these categories. Numerical examples 
from past elections for some of these houses will be used 
from time to time in this thesis. It is also worth noting 
that it is in the context of single-member constituencies 
that bias has been most frequently discussed in the previous 
literature.
In addition, the decomposition of measures of bias
according to its alleged causes will not be attempted. The
detection of the most frequently mooted of these causes -
malapportionment and gerrymandering - is a relatively simple
9matter, which has been well canvassed in the literature.
Finally, the significance of the word measure should be 
emphasised. By this it is implied that the figures produced 
are expressible in the same units as the disadvantage im­
posed on the handicapped party. It is also possible to 
produce indices of bias, such as the correlation of the 
percentage votes for a party in the various constituencies 
and the enrolments in those constituencies,^  but these are 
outside the scope of this study.
In the evaluation of measures of electoral bias, three 
broad criteria are applied - logical soundness, empirical 
acceptability, and statistical simplicity.
The logical soundness of a statistic relates to the 
concepts underlying its use. This criterion embraces such 
issues as whether the statistics postulated are in fact 
"measures" in the sense in which the term has just been 
defined, and whether phenomena which must be quantified are 
in fact quantifiable. Less basic, but still most important,
(6)
is the requirement that measures be based on valid empirical 
assumptions. A measure can be criticized if it is based on 
assumptions which are either universally invalid or unduly 
restrictive; such criticisms will respectively destroy a 
measure, or seriously limit its applicability. Finally, it 
is desirable that measures be simple to calculate and easy 
to interpret.
These criteria will be applied hierarchically. The 
first quality required of a measure must always be logical 
soundness, and the other criteria need only be applied to 
measures which pass this initial test. The criterion of 
simplicity is an important one, since measures which are 
difficult to interpret are unlikely to prove very useful to 
political scientists. In the last resort, however, this 
criterion must be regarded as subsidiary, and the virtue of 
simplicity can never compensate for failings on logical or 
empirical grounds.
II
Reference was made in the first paragraph of Section I 
to "defects inherent in those measures which have hitherto 
been in popular use". The existence of these defects was 
established by the present writer in an earlier work.^ Some 
of the arguments advanced in that work must now be reiterated 
in a condensed form, to establish clearly the need for the 
analysis which follows, and to introduce a number of key 
concepts which provide a framework for that analysis.
The measures of bias considered are those proposed by
(7)
Gudgin and Taylor (in 1974), by Soper and Rydon (in 1958),
12and by Butler (in 1947) . All are based explicitly on the 
assumption of single-member constituencies, each contested 
by only two candidates, bearing the standards of the two 
political parties which exist in the postulated polity. The 
assumption of a pure two-party system is a restrictive one, 
although less so in the case of Australian elections than in 
the case of those in, for example, Great Britain or New 
Zealand, for in Australia in the vast majority of constit­
uencies the Labor and L-NCP candidates unequivocally achieve 
the best and second-best results in the final count, which
allows meaningful (though naturally error-prone) estimates
13of a "two-party preferred vote" to be made. The pure two- 
party situation, despite its distance from reality, requires 
detailed consideration, for theorizing on electoral matters 
largely proceeds heuristically, and if the simplest possible 
state of affairs cannot be rigorously analysed, there will 
exist no platform from which to launch more ambitious invest­
igations. Some analysts might choose to attack these measures 
purely because they are based on the two-party assumption.^  
Such an approach, however, would leave their validity in an 
actual two-party situation unchallenged. The critique about 
to be offered is thus more general, and therefore more damag­
ing, than such an approach.
Underlying all three measures is a concept of bias 
somewhat more precise than that which we have so far used. 
Soper and Rydon in their 1958 paper set out the norm which 
they see as crucial:
(8)
"For any given proportion of the overall vote3 the 
same proportion of seats should he wons whichever 
party is concerned". ^
When this is not fulfilled, there exists what Butler calls 
"bias", what Gudgin and Taylor call "partisan bias", and 
what Soper and Rydon call "under-representation". This 
definition of "bias" has a clear appeal, but it does exhibit 
one slightly paradoxical aspect, namely that it classifies 
as unbiased a situation in which there is a negative relat­
ionship between seats and votes, that is, in which either 
party can win more than half of the seats while winning less 
than half of the total vote.
In the following sections, two main propositions are 
established. The first is that Gudgin and Taylor, and Soper 
and Rydon, err by basing their measures respectively on the 
calculation of "non-partisan bias" and the "effective vote", 
when both are inherently unquantifiable. The second is that 
Butler's measure is based on the empirically untenable 
assumption that in the event of a non-uniform swing in votes 
from one party to the other, the same number of seats will 
change hands as would have been the case had the swing been 
uniform.
Ill
Gudgin and Taylor set out in a general form a measure
16which has been used extensively in Australia and elsewhere.
It is based on a number of empirical propositions about the 
behaviour of electoral systems with single-member
(9)
constituencies. They first note that the proportion of seats 
won by a party under such a system is rarely the same as its 
proportion of the vote. On the basis of this they define 
"electoral bias” as the difference between these two propor­
tions. They next observe that the winning party's proportion 
of the seats typically exceeds its proportion of the vote.^ 
From this they conclude that there exists some systematic 
factor advantaging a party which wins a majority of the vote, 
which they encapsulate in the equation:
(1.1) PS/(1-PS) = f[OV/(l-OV)]
where PS and OV are respectively the proportion of seats and
18of the overall vote won by the party under consideration.
For practical purposes, Gudgin and Taylor use a less general 
equation:
(1.2) PS/U-PS) = [OV/(l-OV)]a
19where a is a number greater than or equal to zero. By
solving this equation for PS and subtracting OV, we obtain
what Gudgin and Taylor call "non-partisan bias" (NPB)
"sinee it accrues to either party depending on which one
20wins a majority or minority of votes". Put formally:
(1.3) NPB = {(OV)“/[(OV)a+(l-OV)a]} - OV
The difference between "electoral bias" and "non-partisan
(10)
bias" constitutes "partisan bias" (PB). This is the quantity 
of main significance. This is formally expressed as:
(1.4) PB = PS - {(0V)“/ [(0V)a+(l-0V)a]}
These concepts are most easily conveyed diagrammatically:
Diagram (1.1)
"Electoral", "Partisan" and "Non-Partisan Bias"
Proportion 
of Seats
0.5 OV
Proportion of 
Overall Vote
In Diagram (1.1), the line OX represents a situation of 
proportional representation. The curve OBX is one defined by
(11)
equation (1.2) for some value of a greater than zero. The 
distance AC represents "electoral bias", the distance AB 
represents "non-partisan bias", and the distance BC repres­
ents "partisan bias".
Clearly, "electoral bias" is known, since we know the 
proportion of seats and votes won by each party. So the 
calculation of "partisan bias" requires the discovery of the 
value of a in equation (1.4). It should be pointed out at 
this stage that the derived value of "non-partisan bias" is 
very sensitive to variations in the value of a. This is 
illustrated in the following table, which sets out values 
of PS derived from equation (1.2) for various values of OV 
and a:
a
Table
1
(1.1)
2 3 4
OV
0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
0.51 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.54
0.52 0.52 0.54 0.56 0.58
0.53 0.53 0.56 0.59 0.62
0.54 0.54 0.58 0.62 0.66
0.55 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.69
0.56 0.56 0.62 0.67 0.72
It can be seen that if, for example, the electorate divides 
54-46, setting a at two instead of three will produce a
(12)
variation of 0.04 in the derived value of PS. The exponent a
must be specified with considerable accuracy.
Although there is no obvious reason for doing so, a
number of analysts, including Gudgin and Taylor, proceed by
21attributing to a a value of three. For them, this follows
from a belief in the so-called "cube law", which must now be
examined in some detail. The modern popularity of the "cube
law" originated in an article by David Butler in "The Econ-
22omist" in January, 1950, which was subsequently elaborated
by Kendall and Stuart in a classic paper published in the 
23same year. For Kendall and Stuart, the "law" is an observed 
empirical regularity , without any particular normative 
implications:
"The law3 briefly 3 states that the proportion of 
seats won by the victorious party varies as the 
cube of the proportion of votes cast for that party 
over the country as a whole"
After making some adjustments for minor party candidacies, 
they find that the "cube law" describes well the results of 
the British general elections of 1935 and 1945.
Kendall and Stuart's investigation of the possible 
causes of this empirical regularity uses a frequency histo­
gram of the proportion of the combined Labour and Conserv­
ative vote in each seat polled by the party winning the 
election. Gudgin and Taylor, who also adopt this approach,
refer to such a histogram as the "constituency proportion
25distribution" (CPD). A typical CPD is set out in the 
following diagram:
(13)
Diagram (1.2)
The Constituency Proportion Distribution
Number of 
Seats
Proportion of 
Vote
Each rectangle represents one constituency. In this 
case, the winning party has won 53 seats, and the losing 
party has won eight seats. As the number of constituencies 
increases, this discrete distribution approaches a continuous 
form, which is mathematically more convenient to manip­
ulate . ^
Kendall and Stuart assume that electoral swing will take 
the form of a "sliding" of the entire CPD along the horizon­
tal axis, so that its shape is unchanged, and prove that if 
this is so, the "cube law" will hold, provided that the CPD
is approximately normal, with a standard deviation of 
270.137 . They emphasise that the "law" is merely an empir­
ical pattern:
"The validity of the law of the cubic proportion 
then depends on three things, (a) the empirical
(14)
fact that the distribution of proportions p_ at an 
election is nearly normal3 (b) the mathematical
fact that the cubic-proportion law very closely 
approximates to a normal form with the same vari­
ance and (c) the empirical fact the the variance 
of the cubic-proportion law is very closely approx­
imated by the variance of the observed distribut­
ions . The law is thus not universal"
This passage can be interpreted in two ways. It can be viewed 
as advancing a model of the "cube law" as briefly defined 
earlier, that is, a set of sufficient (though not necessary) 
conditions for the cubic seats-votes relationship to hold. 
Alternatively, it can be seen as a new and more restrictive 
definition of the "cube law". The distinction is an import­
ant one, because the alternative interpretations give rise 
to different strategies of empirical testing. The broader 
version of the "law" can be tested by examining the propor­
tions of seats and votes gained by a party at one or more 
elections, whereas to test the narrower version, the CPDs 
which actually occur must be looked at. The latter approach 
is adopted by Kendall and Stuart, and the trend towards a 
narrow interpretation of the meaning of the "cube law" has 
continued in much of the subsequent literature.
The "law" has been tested empirically by Kendall and
Stuart themselves, Butler, Gudgin and Taylor, March, Tufte,
Linehan and Schrodt, Brookes, Soper and Rydon, Sankoff and
29Mellos, Laakso, and Robins. We need not look at these 
studies in great detail, but three are worthy of mention, if
(15)
only to illustrate the difficulties which they encounter.
Tufte fits a logit regression model to seats-votes data
from seven polities, and rejects the "cube law" hypothesis
30for six of them. Linehan and Schrodt re-estimate the para­
meters using a non-linear regression procedure, and obtain
31results much more favourable to the "law”. In a note
published in 1979, Laakso obtains results which are "too
32ambiguous for a general interpretation”, and which vary 
according to the degree of disaggregation of the analysis, 
and the number of parties considered. Taken as a whole, 
these studies are quite ambivalent about the "cube law", and 
reflect the limited empirical support which it has received 
in the literature.
However, from the standpoint of justifying the choice 
of three as a value for a, these studies are irrelevant.
What is required to provide such a justification is not 
empirical evidence supporting the "cube law", but a theory 
implying that in the absence of partisan bias, a cannot take 
any value but three. Much confusion arises from the failure 
to make this crucial distinction.
At first glance this point might appear to be a simple 
consequence of "Hume's Law" - that one cannot deduce a norm­
ative precept from a set of pure statements of positive 
facts - but this in fact is not the case; for Gudgin and
Taylor, non-partisan bias is itself a real, objective phen- 
33omenon. The problem is a more basic one. A value for a 
can only be deduced from past electoral outcomes if it is 
assumed a priori that partisan bias was absent in the cases
(16)
observed, and there is no logical reason for making such an 
assumption. This is so even if CPDs, rather than total seats 
and votes at a number of elections, are examined. Although 
Gudgin and Taylor see each possible value of a as being 
isomorphically related to a particular symmetrical CPD, even 
a symmetrical CPD can be seen as merely a deviation from 
another symmetrical CPD which in some sense is the '’real”, 
’’underlying” distribution.^^
Gudgin and Taylor appear to see models of the gener­
ation of a CPD with the variance required for the "cube law” 
to hold as constituting theories of the type which we have
seen are necessary. Such models are advanced by Kendall and
35Stuart, March, and Gudgin and Taylor themselves. We shall 
briefly look at them all.
Kendall and Stuart put forward two tentative ideas. The 
first is a Markov chain model, in which constituencies are 
produced by drawing samples from the total electorate. The 
sampling process, however, displays the property that succ­
essive choices are correlated, so that if a voter for party 
A is chosen at a given draw, it is highly likely that a voter
for party A will also be chosen at the next draw. This can
36be formally expressed as follows:
Let P(A|A) be the probability that if a voter from 
party A is drawn, the next voter drawn will also be from 
party A.
Let P(A|B) be the probability that if a voter from 
party B is drawn, the next voter drawn will be from party A. 
Let e = P(A|A) - P(AIB); by hypothesis, P(A|A) > P(A|B).
(17)
Let gß be the proportion of party A voters in the total 
electorate.
Let g be a random variable, the proportion of votes for
party A in equal-sized constituencies of T voters.
Kendall and Stuart point out that as T approaches
infinity, the probability distribution of g approaches the
37normal distribution, with mean gg and variance given by:
(1.5) Var (g) = [gQ (l-gQ) (1+e)] / [t (1-e)]
Two aspects of the model are important. First, it must be 
noted that it only gives the asymptotic probability distrib­
ution of the random variable g. It does not guarantee that 
the empirical CPD produced by such a scheme will be normal 
(in the sense defined in footnote 27). However, it can be 
said that for large values of T, the probability of the CPD . 
deviating substantially from normality will be small, and
there is some evidence to suggest that for this particular
3 8scheme, convergence to normality is quite rapid.
Secondly, it is clear that to produce a variance
sufficient to explain the "cube law", e must be very close
to one for typical values of T. Kendall and Stuart point out
that for T = 60,000 (a typical constituency size), the model
39requires that e - 0.9995. This implies a similar high value 
for P(A|A), and a very low value for P(A|B), since P(A|B) £
0, and P(A I A) < 1.
As Gudgin and Taylor point out, this model is analogous 
to a situation in which the overall electorate from which
(18)
samples are drawn is divided into perfectly homogeneous
spatial clusters, of a precise average size determined by the
40values of gQ and T . For g^ = 0.5, and T = 60,000, clusters
41of about 5,000 voters are required. But this makes the 
model highly implausible in many cases. In the Australian 
context, for example, the most cursory scrutiny of sub- 
divisional returns for elections for the Commonwealth House 
of Representatives makes clear that there are no parts of 
the country sufficiently politically homogeneous to fulfil 
the requirements of the model. This empirical implausibility 
leads Kendall and Stuart to discount the value of their 
Markov model.
The second model involves what is known as a Lexian 
sampling scheme. Constituencies are regarded as random sam­
ples from larger sub-groups of the overall electorate. Each 
constituency consists of voters taken entirely from one sub­
group, and each sub-group contributes equally to the total 
number of samples. We let g^  be the probability that a voter 
taken from the ith sub-group votes for party A. The random 
variable g again is asymptotically normally distributed, 
with variance given by: ^
(1.6) Var(g) = [gQ(l-g0) + (T-l).Var(g^)]/T
With T large, Var (g) - Var(g^ .).
From our viewpoint this scheme has one decisive defect. 
Although it is capable of generating a "cube law" CPD, it can 
also generate CPDs with higher or lower variances, depending,
(19)
upon the variance of , and thus can model other "laws". It 
therefore does not provide an adequate justification for the 
choice of three as a unique value for a.
March's model sees the CPD as a synthesis of two hypo­
thetical distributions, one unimodal and reflecting broad 
scale inter-party decisions regarding factors such as cam­
paign resource allocation across the constituencies, and the 
other bimodal, reflecting such factors as varying voter 
enthusiasm and despair in safe and marginal seats.^ This 
model is criticised in detail by Gudgin and Taylor.^ For 
our purposes, we need merely note that its generation of a 
"cube law" CPD depends crucially upon the fortuitous occurr­
ence of particular values of a number of exogenous para­
meters. Alternative values of these parameters can produce a
normal CPD with a different variance, and can even produce a 
45Poisson CPD. The model is therefore open to precisely the 
same criticism as that directed at Kendall and Stuart's 
Lexian scheme, and thus fails to justify the choice of three 
as a value for a.
Gudgin and Taylor put forward four models. The first
two are based on binomial sampling schemes, are put forward
only for didactic purposes, and are incapable of producing a
CPD with a sufficiently high variance for the "cube law" to 
46hold. The third is a variant of Kendall and Stuart's Lexian
model, in which g^ is assumed to be a random variable with a
two-parameter beta distribution. Under such a scheme, the
value of the term "Var(g^.)" in equation (1.6) is determined
47by the values of the parameters of that distribution.
(20)
However, there is no prior reason for assuming that these 
parameters can only take values which will ensure the prod­
uction of a CPD with the "cube law" variance, and for this 
reason Gudgin and Taylor's Lexian scheme fails on the same 
grounds as that of Kendall and Stuart.
The fourth model, upon which Gudgin and Taylor place 
most emphasis, is a development of Kendall and Stuart's 
Markov chain scheme. Constituencies are created by the ran­
dom choice of clusters of voters , rather than individuals.^ 
Two types of clusters are postulated. One is a "working 
class" cluster, in which the proportion of party A voters is
equal to w. The other is a "middle class" cluster, in which
49the proportion of party B voters is equal to w . We denote 
by T the equal numbers of voters in each constituency, and 
by c the equal number of voters in each cluster. The variance 
of the resulting random variable g is given by:"*^
(1.7) Var (g) = [(2w-l) 2gQ (l-g0)c (1+e)] (1-e)
Gudgin and Taylor point out that for a given constituency 
size and overall vote, Var(^) will depend on (i) the size 
of the clusters (e), (ii) the internal homogeneity of the 
clusters (w) and (iii) the concentration of the clusters 
between constituencies (indicated by e), each of which can 
vary independently of the others.“^  Their study includes an 
empirical investigation of voting patterns in Newcastle upon 
Tyne, which suggests the occurrence in that region of a set 
of parameter values implying a reasonable approximation to a
(21)
52"cube law" variance. They argue that the model:
"can he viewed as both an explanation of the cube
law and as setting up a standard form against whiah
53actual CPDs may be compared".
In its role as a standard form, the model is not susceptible 
to empirical testing. Its validity must therefore depend on 
the extent to which its major structural features have 
analogues in the real world. Here it falls down in two main 
respects. It does not allow for variations in the sizes of 
constituencies or clusters, which limits its applicability. 
More importantly, it assumes that clusters are discrete and 
homogeneous. The difficulty arises in the identification of 
clusters as the basic units of analysis, notwithstanding the 
fact that at any given election the pattern of clustering 
which actually occurs is the result of the voting decisions 
of the individual electors. Now with a free ballot, the 
possibility of considerable fluctuations in clustering patt­
erns from election to election must be admitted. But in such 
a confused situation, the boundaries of clusters, and there­
fore their sizes, become ill-defined, and Var(^) becomes 
meaningless. This seriously undermines the claim that the 
model provides "a standard form against which actual CPDs 
may be compared". For these reasons, it must be regarded as 
inadequate for our purposes.
Apart from the preceding models based on the CPD, a 
number of other models of the "cube law" have been put 
forward. Casstevens and Morris base their analysis on the 
hypothetical construct of a party’s "share" of a seat.^
(2 2)
This approach has been criticized in detail by Gudgin and
55Taylor; its inadequacy for us lies in the fact that its 
central concept is a purely hypothetical one, with no ana­
logue in the actual system of vote scrutiny.
56A rather different approach is taken by Theil. His
model is based on a decomposition of the vote in each seat
into a local constituency effect, and an overall election
effect. However, Theil explicitly assumes that for a given
swing in the overall vote, the swing to the party gaining will
be greatest in its previously weakest seats, and least in
its previously strongest s e a t s T h i s  assumption is an
intuitively appealing one, but as a foundation of a general
explanation of the "cube lawM, it is rendered dubious by
contrary evidence. The issue is discussed at some length by
Butler and Stokes, who point out that at the five British
elections from 1951, swing at the constituency level appears
to be relatively independent of the initial level of party 
5 8support. Since Britain has been found in several studies
to be that polity which most closely conforms to the "cube
law", this observation is particularly damaging to Theil's 
59model. Taagepera also notes that the model may only work
well when the division of total votes between the two parties
is approximately even, since otherwise the error terms in a
number of Taylor series approximations in Theil's proof
60become unacceptably large.
Quandt examines the "cube law" through the application
of an impressive stochastic model of voting, based on the
61uniform and beta distributions. Once again, however, the
(23)
model is a general one, which produces the "cube law" as an 
asymptotic outcome when a number of probability distribution 
parameters conveniently occur. For this reason, Quandt's 
analysis cannot justify the exclusive choice of three as a 
value for a.
In this brief survey of the literature, no adequate 
support for the choice of three as a value for a in equation 
(1.4) has been found. Some analysts have put forward models 
which imply different values for a. Sankoff and Mellos, for 
example, demonstrate through the application of game theory 
that:
"If the parties in a two-party system could freely 
allocate their total support among the constit­
uencies 3 we should expect a swing ratio equal to
. „ 62 two .
They further suggest that the swing ratio associated with the
"cube law" will be generated if one third of the voters are
"hard core". In a subsequent article, Sankoff reaches a
similar conclusion for a situation in which party resources
are partially fixed in some districts, by applying the game 
6 3of "Blotto". The major problem with these models, conceded 
by Sankoff and Mellos, is that the assumption that parties 
can freely decide the distribution of their votes is unreal­
istic. At best, party control of vote distributions occurs 
through media of the type discussed by March, which are so 
crude and unpredictable in their effects as to render their 
use for "fine tuning" impossible.
Finally, an interesting conjecture put forward by
(24)
Taagepera must be considered. He suggests that the exponent 
a is equal to the ratio of the natural logarithms of the 
number of voters (v) and the number of seats (n) in the 
polity under consideration. He notes that when v = n, a = 1, 
which represents a case of extreme proportional represent­
ation, and that when n = 1, a = °°, which represents a case 
of direct presidential election. Reasoning from a postulated
two-stage electoral process, Taagepera derives the equat-
64ion:
(1.8) a(v ,n) = m(y)/m(n)
There are two flaws in nis line of reasoning. First, he 
admits that there is no "clear cut proof" that the function
6 Sm( ) in equation (1.8) is the natural logarithmic function.
Secondly, he assumes that a depends only on the number of
6 6voters and seats. While this is true in the unrealistic 
boundary cases on which he relies, it is not obviously true 
in cases where the number of seats is much greater than one, 
but much less than the number of voters. Taagepera offers 
no argument in support of this assumption. These defects 
make Taagepera's approach an unsatisfactory one.
But to use Gudgin and Taylor's measure, a value for a 
must be specified. So far, we have accepted the assumption 
that this can be done. This must now be challenged. To do 
this, equation (1.1) must be looked at rather more closely. 
The implication of this equation is that a certain propor­
tion of the majority enjoyed by a winning party comes about
(25)
purely as a result of the overall proportion of the vote 
which it wins. Gudgin and Taylor equate this with a situat­
ion in which the CPD is symmetrical. For each possible value 
of a, there exists a corresponding symmetrical CPD.
Gudgin and Taylor's approach, therefore, involves see­
ing the skewed CPDs which actually occur as deviations from 
one of these symmetrical CPDs. But CPDs are produced by a 
multitude of individual voting decisions. The act of specify­
ing a unique value for a constitutes an assertion that had 
votes not been cast in the pattern in which they were, they 
could have been cast in only one other pattern so as to 
produce a symmetrical CPD. But such an assertion is unten­
able. Had the people not voted as they did, there is no 
logical way of knowing for certain how they would have voted. 
The problem, therefore, is not that a value of a exists but 
cannot be discovered; it is that the very idea of a unique 
value for a is absurd. With single-member constituencies, 
there simply can never be a functional relationship between 
overall proportions of seats and votes, and it is absurd to 
proceed on the basis that we can know what this relationship 
would be if it existed.
Non-partisan bias is thus clearly revealed as a concept 
which for purely logical reasons cannot be quantified. The 
measure of partisan bias put forward by Gudgin and Taylor 
must therefore be set aside.
IV
Let us now turn to the measure put forward by Soper and
(26)
6 7Rydon. This has proved to be very popular in Australian
psephology, and has also been noted in a number of overseas 
6 8studies. They propose as a measure of "under-representation"
the difference between the overall proportion of the vote
obtained by a party, and the "effective vote" for that 
69party. By the "effective vote", Soper and Rydon mean that 
vote for a party which would have produced the actually ob­
served division of seats if partisan bias (as defined by - 
Gudgin and Taylor) had not been present.^ This concept once 
again can be conveyed diagrammatically:
Diagram (1.3)
The Effective Vote
Proportion 
of Seats
(27)
In this diagram, the curve OBX represents a particular 
’’standard of exaggeration of majorities” (or to use Gudgin 
and Taylor’s terminology, a specific level of non-partisan 
bias). ’’Under-representation” is given by OV - OV^. The 
symmetry of this measure and that of Gudgin and Taylor is 
immediately obvious. The same assumptions and empirical 
propositions underlie both, but in Soper and Rydon’s 
measure, the decision is made to measure bias in terms of' 
votes rather than seats.
The main defect in their measure is simply that it is 
not possible to specify a unique "effective vote”. The 
argument that demonstrates this follows directly from that 
mounted against Gudgin and Taylor's measure. "Under­
representation” is conceded by Soper and Rydon to be a 
function of the pattern of votes cast. To postulate a dis­
coverable "effective vote” is to argue that it is possible 
to discover the pattern in which votes would have been cast 
had they not been cast in the pattern in which they were.
The absurdity of this has already been pointed out. Since an 
election can logically be viewed as a deviation from any 
number of possible "standards of exaggeration of majorities” 
there are also any number of "effective votes”, one for each 
possible "standard”; the idea of a unique "effective vote” 
is therefore absurd. On the basis of this, it can be seen 
that Soper and Rydon's measure is ill-founded.
V
Finally, let us consider the measure proposed by David
(28)
Butler in the early Nuffield election studies. He deduces 
from the CPD of an individual election a curve giving the 
division of seats associated with each possible division of 
the vote. He does this by noting the number of seats which 
would fall to uniform swings of different sizes. From this 
curve, the division of seats at a 50-50 division of the vote 
can be read, and the divergence of this seat division from a 
50-50 split constitutes the level of bias.^
The assumption of uniform swing is obviously unreal­
istic. But Butler relies rather on the assumption that in 
the event of a non-uniform swing, the net number of seats
changing hands will be the same as if the swing had been 
72uniform. This assumption seemed plausible in early post­
war Britain, but does not stand up to scrutiny in the case 
73of Australia. Table (1.2) sets out the errors induced by 
this assumption for those House of Representatives elections, 
since 1958 not preceded by a full electoral redistribution.^
(29)
Table (1.2)
Year Benefit to ALP 
of non-uniform 
swing (seats)
Swing to 
A L P  (7o)
Std. dev. 
of swing
1958 -1 -0.32 3.5
1961 6 4.65 3.4
1963 0 -3.14 3.3
1966 -1 -4.34 4.4
1972 2 2.50 4.2
1974 1 -1.01 3.5
1975 -3 -7.38 2.7
1980 -2 4.20 3.0
The figures in the second column are obtained by subtracting
from the number of seats actually won by the ALP the number
of seats which the ALP would have won had the swing been
uniform. The mean absolute error is two seats, or about 1.67»
with a maximum error of six seats, or 4.917», in 1961. It is
also apparent that there is some positive correlation between 
the error occurring at a particular election, and the swing 
at that election.^
Although these data alone provide a counter-example to
Butler's assumption, two other recent cases are worthy of
mention. The first is the South Australian general election
of 1979. A uniform swing would have given the non-Labor side
of politics 24 seats. In fact, the non-Labor parties won 27
7 6seats (and government), an error of 6.387,. This example is
(30)
particularly striking because a prominent opposition member, 
Mr Ren de Garis, relying on Butler's methodology, had accused 
the ALP government of perpetrating a "vicious gerrymander".^ 
The second case to note is the New Zealand general election 
of 1978. At that election, Labour won six fewer seats than
78it would have won with a uniform swing, an error of 6.52%.
These tests of Butler's empirical assumption might be 
thought to be unnecessarily severe, and indeed Butler only 
claims approximate accuracy for his "empirical formulas". To 
this two responses can be made. The first is that there is 
no clearly defined point at which a formula's predictions 
cease to be approximately accurate. The second is that the 
degree of accuracy required of such formulas must vary accor­
ding to their application. If they are to be used, for 
example, to interpret public opinion polls during an election 
campaign, a prediction error of five or six seats may be 
tolerable. But when bias is being measured, very much greater 
accuracy is required. If the size of bias figures is small,
say two or three seats, the possibility of prediction errors
7 9of the order of six seats completely destroys their value.
It is for this reason that great importance must be attached 
to the counter-examples just cited. They lead ineluctably to 
the conclusion that Butler's approach is inadequate.
VI
Let us now take stock of the argument to this point. 
Three popular measures of bias have been examined and found 
to be defective. But the point must be made that there is a
(31)
common element in the defectiveness of all three, which 
strikes at the very heart of the concept of bias upon which 
they are based. Recall the norm set out by Soper and Rydon:
"For any given proportion of the overall vote3 the 
same proportion of seats should be won3 whichever 
party is concerned".
Now for any election, the proportion of seats achieved by the
winner is known. But the proportion of seats which the loser
would have obtained with the same vote can never be known,
for as has been made clear, this is not a uniquely deter-
80minable proportion, but a random variable. This is a fact 
with which Gudgin and Taylor, and Soper and Rydon, never 
adequately cope, while Butler tries to deal with it by the 
adoption of an unrealistic empirical assumption.
It follows from this that the statistics described and 
analysed so far in this chapter are not even measures as the 
term has been defined. Since the seats-votes relationship is 
a stochastic one, differences in this relationship from party 
to party take the form of differences in the chances which 
the various parties have of winning a specified proportion of 
the seats with a given proportion of the vote. Measures of 
bias must reflect this fact.
It follows that there is a logically defensible way of 
overcoming the problem. Since the proportion of seats won 
with a given proportion of the vote is a random variable, 
probability theory and statistical theory are the appropriate 
tools to use in the investigation of their relationship. The 
adoption of a probabilistic approach makes necessary the
(32)
replacement of the norm used by Soper and Rydon. It can be 
required that:
For any given proportion of the overall vote3 the 
probabilities of the various possible divisions of 
the seats should be the same for all parties.
Rather less stringently, it can be required that:
For any given proportion of the overall vote3 the 
expected number of seats won should be the same 
for all parties.
The former implies the latter; the converse is not true. The
precise manner in which these norms are translated into
measures of bias depends on the statistical techniques in
use. A detailed defence of the use of probabilistic models
in the analysis of electoral processes is set out by Niemi 
81and Weisberg.
One final point should be made. In the most popular 
axiomatization of probability theory, that of Kolmogorov, 
"probability" figures as a primitive, undefined concept, 
and the interpretation to be placed on numerical probabil-
8 2ities has been a matter of vigorous philosophical dispute.
Henceforth, when we refer to the probability that an
individual, constituency or nation votes in a particular way,
we shall take this to be a measure of an objective propensity
for such an outcome to occur. This view, put forward by Karl
8 3Popper, is designed so as to avoid the criticisms put 
forward by frequency theorists of dealing with the probab­
ilities of events which by their very nature cannot in 
principle be indefinitely repeated (into which category
(33)
voting clearly falls).^ This interpretation is implicit in
85the terminology used by Gudgin and Taylor, and provides a 
framework into which such concepts as the strength of party 
allegiance, and the safety of seats, can be translated.
VII
The remainder of this thesis will be concerned with the 
development of some probabilistic measures of bias.
In the second chapter, it is shown that an assumption 
that the vote won by a party in each seat is an independent 
random variable implies a stochastic seats-votes relation­
ship. Initially within the framework of a two-party assump­
tion, it is shown that a measure of bias can be calculated 
easily if the probability distributions of the government's 
proportion of the vote in each seat can be specified. The 
bulk of the chapter considers this specification problem in 
detail, and it is concluded that plausible, though not 
objectively correct, specifications can be provided. Some 
limitations to the plausibility of such specifications are 
noted, and finally the measure is formulated to cope with a 
multi-party situation. It is argued that the measure devel­
oped is a simple and useful one.
In the third chapter, the application of the two- 
variable linear regression model to the problem of bias 
measurement is considered. The empirical validity of the 
assumptions underlying the model is examined thoroughly, and 
it is noted that in some cases the use of generalized least- 
squares estimators may prove to be necessary. Once again,
(34)
circumstances are identified in which derived bias figures 
will be invalid, and it is argued that subject to this 
limitation the measure of bias produced is a useful one.
The fourth chapter considers two analyses, which model 
the seats-votes relationship probabilistically without 
proposing direct empirical measures of bias. It is shown 
that measures of bias can, in fact, be derived from these 
analyses; it is further shown, however, that they are less 
useful than the measure derived in Chapter Two, since they 
share its pitfalls and in addition are much more difficult 
to apply practically.
In conclusion, it is argued that the measures of bias 
produced do avoid the problem that haunts the previous 
literature; that the investigator in choosing between the 
measures of Chapters Two and Three must be guided both by 
the data available and the extent to which their respective 
underlying assumptions are fulfilled; and that the measures, 
when appropriately used, are sound and useful tools for 
electoral analysis.
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Chapter Two - Pendulum Models
I
This chapter commences by setting out a simple two- 
party model of the electoral pendulum, in which it is shown 
that the characterization of a party's vote in each seat as 
an independent random variable implies that its share of 
seats in the legislature is a random variable. The assump­
tion of the independence of swings in different seats is then 
examined critically, as is the specification of their distr­
ibutions used in the model. It is shown that the analysis 
can be extended to situations in which different numbers of 
votes are cast in different seats. It is next argued that 
the most useful measure of bias is the ratio of the probab­
ility of a government legislative majority to the probability 
of an opposition legislative majority when there is an 
expected even division of the overall vote. Methods of cal­
culating these probabilities, given the probability distrib­
utions of the government's proportions of the vote in each 
seat, are then set out. The problem of specifying these 
probability distributions is then examined in detail, and it 
is shown that plausible, though not objectively correct, 
simulations of these distributions can be made. A specific 
example involving the calculation of the level of bias at 
the 1980 Australian general election is given, and the 
chapter concludes with a consideration of ways in which the 
model can be adjusted to cope with a multi-party situation.
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It has been demonstrated that electoral pendulums do 
not always give accurate predictions of the number of seats 
which will change hands with a given overall swing. However, 
there may be limited conditions under which pendulums will 
consistently work accurately. Just such a possibility is 
asserted by Butler in his history of the British electoral 
system:
"The empirical formulas which have been mentioned 
are based on the assumption of universal and equal 
swings from one party to another in all constit­
uencies . Upon investigation this assumption is 
found to be satisfied to a remarkable extent3 
although the turnover in votes between one constit­
uency and the next is by no means completely 
uniform. Strictly speaking 3 however 3 the empirical 
formulas only require that there should be no 
substantial correlation between current swing and 
previous majority in each constituency; such 
variations in swing as do occur may then be assumed 
to cancel out" . ^
The crucial sentence in this passage is the final one. It is
not clear whether Butler is claiming that the absence of
correlation between current swing and previous majority is
necessary for the pendulum to work accurately, or merely
sufficient. However, neither claim can be sustained. Necessity
has already been disproved by Gudgin and Taylor, and need
2not be considered*further. To disprove sufficiency, it is
II
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necessary to demonstrate a case in which Butler's condition 
is satisfied, but in which the pendulum does not work accur­
ately. Before proceeding to this proof, it is necessary to 
make one minor qualification. In the context of the passage 
set out above, it does Butler more justice if his claim is 
taken to be that in the event of his condition being satis­
fied, then on average the pendulum will prove to be accurate. 
The following analysis, which incorporates this qualification, 
tests the assertion of sufficiency.
Ill
Consider a system in which there are only two parties.
The legislature consists of n seats in which an equal number
of votes are cast, and each party contests every seat. Let
B^. be the proportion of the vote polled by the government in
3the ith seat at the (f-l)th election. The set of B^s, i =
1,2 ...n, is the logical equivalent of an electoral pendulum. 
Let S^. be the swing against the government in the ith seat 
at the tth election. The proportion of the vote polled by the 
government in the ith. seat at the ith election is therefore 
given by:
(2.1) V. = B.-S.
First assume uniform swing. This is characterized by:
( 2. 2) = y , i = 1,2...n
(60)
Let I . be an indicator variable which takes a value of one 
o,v
if and only if > 0.5, and a value of zero if and only if 
4V_£ < 0.5 . The possibility that = 0.5 is not entertained. 
In most polities, a tie in the count in a single-member 
constituency is most improbable. At Australian general 
elections, such an occurrence is impossible.^
Suppose there are k seats for which Bv-y (i.e. V^) <
0.5. For those seats, E(Ic )^ = 0. For the remaining n-k 
seats, E(I = 1. Therefore, the expected total number 
of seats won by the government at the tth election is given 
by:
(2.3) E(IIcJ  = n-k
i
Next assume that the swing in each seat is a continuous 
random variable, with a density function g(S^). (To avoid 
ambiguity, references in future to actually manifested values 
of random variables will be marked by the addition of the 
subscript a, so that indicates the swing which actually
occurs in the ith seat at the tth election.)
A specification of g(S^) which satisfies Butler’s con­
dition is that the swing in each seat be independently, 
identically, normally distributed:^
(2.4) Si ^ N(y, a2), i = 1,2...n
where y has the same value as in expression (2.2). Since B„.
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is a constant, it follows that:
(2.5) V. ^ N(B^-p, a2), i =
Let I . be an indicator variable which takes a value of one rv
if and only if V^ . > 0.5, and a value of zero if and only if 
< 0.5, with the possibility that = 0.5 again excluded 
by assumption.
In this case II ., the number of seats won by the 
government at the tth election, is a random variable which 
has the generalized binomial distribution.^  The expected 
value and variance of this variable are given by:
( 2 . 6)
where p^ = P ( I ^  = 1), = P(V^.>0.5), and = 1-p^. This is 
derived by integrating the density function f(V^) implied by 
expression (2.5):
(2.7) pi = f0.S f(Vi> dVi
= l-/0 '5 f(V.) dV.
- C O  l '  ^
= l-$[(0.5+u-Bi)/a]
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where $( ) is the distribution function of a standard normal
9variable. Combining expressions (2.6) and (2.7) gives:
(2.8) E(EI )^ = «-^[(O.S+y-B^/a]
i i
By equating the left-hand-sides of expressions (2.8) and 
(2.3), it can be seen that random non-uniform swing of the 
type assumed will produce the same expected division of 
seats as a uniform swing if and only if:
(2.9) n-Z$[(0.5+u-B^)/a] = n-k
Butler's claim therefore amounts to an assertion that the 
condition in expression (2.9) will always be satisfied, for 
any values of n, B^, o and p . This is most easily tested by 
empirical calculation, since analytical expressions for the 
left-hand-side of expression (2.9) are very difficult to 
obtain. Assume the B^ .s to be the estimates prepared by 
Mackerras of the government's proportion of the two-party 
preferred vote in each seat at the 1977 Australian general 
election, which include adjustments to take account of the 
effects of the partial electoral redistribution conducted in 
Western Australia in 1979.^ The fact that estimates rather 
than actual figures are used does not impugn the validity 
of the test; any logically possible set of figures could be 
used, since it is asserted that expression (2.9) holds for
all B^. Table (2.1) sets out values of E(ZI )^ and E(ZIr .^)
i i
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for a number of different values of y and a: 11
Table (2.1)
E<?Xci>
y a
.01 .02 .03 .04 .05
-.05 97 97.3 97.4 97.4 97.3 96.9
oi 96 95.7 95.5 95.3 94.9 94.5
coo1 94 93.8 93.5 93.1 92.5 91.9
-.02 90 91.6 91.3 90.7 89.9 89.2
- .01 90 89.6 88.9 88.0 87.2 86.4
0 87 87.1 86.0 85.1 84.2 83.4
.01 84 83.5 82.6 81.9 81.1 80.2
.02 78 78.7 78.9 78.4 77.7 76.9
.03 74 74.4 75.0 74.8 74.1 73.4
.04 72 71.3 71.2 70.9 70.4 69.7
.05 69 67.9 67.3 66.9 66.5 65.9
It can be seen immediately that E(IIc )^ and E(EIr .^) are not
i i
always equal. Although they have approximately the same value 
when a = 0.01, they diverge quite notably as a increases,
with E(IIr .^) generally decreasing. These data suffice to
i
disprove Butler's assertion of sufficiency.
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IV
This model has been used to prove a narrow point. How­
ever, its second section, which assumes random swing with a 
given distribution, has utility which extends well beyond 
such recondite analysis, and its major features are thus 
worthy of close attention.
The crucial source of its versatility lies in the fact 
that it specifies the probability distribution of the total 
number of seats won by the government in the event of a 
given probability distribution of swing in each seat. From 
this we can calculate the probability of any possible div­
ision of the legislature, and determine the odds against a 
parliamentary majority for the government, something which 
cannot be done when uniform swing is assumed. Since the
latter point has been advanced as a major criticism of
12Mackerras’s approach, the model constitutes a theoretical 
improvement upon the deterministic formulation of the pend­
ulum (which it includes as a special case when a = 0).
In the development of the model, four important assump­
tions are made. These are:
(i) The existence of only two parties, both of which 
contest every seat.
(ii) The independence of swing in different constit­
uencies .
(iii) The identical, normal distribution of swing in 
all constituencies.
(iv) The equality of the number of votes cast in each
seat.
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Consideration of the first of these will be deferred until 
Section IX of this chapter, but (ii), (iii) and (iv) will be 
dealt with immediately.
Independence of Swing
The assumption of the independence of swing is funda­
mental; if it is not fulfilled, El  ^will not have the
i - -
generalized binomial distribution. It can be put formally
13as:
(2.10) P(S.=S.JSr Sia) = PCS-S.p, i
Informally, it means that the probability distribution of 
swing in a given seat is unaffected by the outcome in any 
other. In the context of polities such as the United Kingdom, 
New Zealand and the Australian States, this is a reasonable 
assumption to make, since the polls close simultaneously in 
all constituencies. The outcome in one constituency is thus 
unable to affect the polling in another.
This can be contrasted with three situations in which 
the assumption is violated to different extents. The first 
arises at Australian House of Representatives elections, 
when because of time zone differences the polls close earlier 
in New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Tasmania and the 
A.C.T., than in South Australia, the Northern Territory and 
Western Australia.^  In Western Australia, the time lag is 
sufficient to give very late voters some indication of the 
early count in the eastern states. There is, however, no
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evidence which suggests widespread use of this information 
as the basis for voting decisions in Western Australia; even 
if there were, it would only bring the validity of the model 
into question if a significant number of seats in Western 
Australia were closely contested.
The second situation arises at U.S. Congressional 
elections. There, the time zone problem is accentuated by 
the greater differences in times, and by voluntary voting. 
Many west-coast Democrats, for example, believed that 
President Carter's early concession of victory to his 
Republican challenger in 1980 jeopardized the positions of 
those sharing a ticket with him in the Pacific and Rocky 
Mountain states; it is difficult to know whether this belief 
was well-founded.^
The third situation arose under the pre-1918 British 
practice of conducting the polling at a general election over 
a period of some weeks in different parts of the country.
For elections so conducted, the assumption of independence 
of swing is not at all plausible.
None of these, however, constitutes evidence against the 
validity of the independence assumption. Rather, they are 
cases in which the evidence for the assumption is of varying 
strength. In the Australian case, it is still reasonable 
(and very useful) to assume independence of swing, and this 
will henceforth be taken for granted.
Identically normally distributed swing
This assumption appears in the model because it
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satisfies Butler's condition, and simplifies the computation 
of the figures in Table (2.1). There are, however, some 
theoretical reasons for assuming that swing is normally 
distributed, which will be put forward in Section VII of 
this chapter.
Strictly speaking, when normality is assumed there 
exists the possibility that could take a value outside 
the zero to one range. This possibility, of course, also 
exists when uniform swing is assumed. But under the assumpt­
ion of normality, the contingency is remote. To give a 
numerical example: On Mackerras's two-party preferred vote
estimate, the largest overall swing at an Australian general
16election in the last twenty years was 0.074 in 1975.
The largest standard deviation of swing in the last twenty 
years was 0.044 in 1966. Consider a seat in which B^ is 
equal to only 0.2, a level below which the major parties in 
Australia hardly ever fall. If S^. ^ N(0.074, 0.001936), then 
^ N (0.126, 0.001936). The probability that will take 
a value less than zero is only 0.002. For the purposes of 
the model, this can safely be disregarded.
It is very important to note that although the pro­
numeral y has the same value in expressions (2.2) and (2.4), 
it does not have the same meaning. In (2.2), y denotes the 
size of the swing which is assumed to actually occur in each 
seat. An implication of that assumption is that the mean and 
overall swings will also be equal to y. In (2.4), on the 
other hand, y is merely a parameter of the probability 
distribution of the random variable S.. Under such a scheme,
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the mean swing will itself be a random variable, and basic
sampling theory shows that it will itself be normally distr-
2 17ibuted, with mean y and variance a In. The overall swing
will also be a random variable, and the assumption that an
equal number of votes are cast in each seat ensures that it
will have the same distribution as the mean swing. Rather
than analysing the consequences of a given overall swing,
the model thus analyses the consequences of a choice of
swing distribution parameters for each seat which give rise
to a particular expected value of overall swing.
The rigid assumption of identically normally distributed
swing can be relaxed in two ways. First, the assumption of
normality can be retained, while the mean and variance of
swing are allowed to differ from seat to seat. If this is
2expressed as v N(y^ ., c )^ , expression (2.7) then becomes: 
(2.11) Pi = l-$[(0.5+pi-Bi)/ai]
Under such a scheme, the mean swing remains normally distrib-
2 2uted with mean ly^/n and variance Lo^/n , and the overall
i 2_g 'i
swing has the same distribution.
Secondly, swing can be allowed to take other types of
distributions. It has already been pointed out that the
deterministic formulation of the pendulum assumes that swing
has an identical degenerate distribution in all seats . The
use of appropriately scaled and centered beta distributions
is also possible, since this could limit V^. to the zero to
one range. The assumption that has mean y^  and variance
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■ ^ again leads to the conclusion that the mean and overall
2 , 2swings will have mean Z\i^ ./n and variance Zo^ ./n , though they
i ^
will no longer be normally distributed.
Equality of the number of votes cast in each seat
This is a simplifying assumption which, as has been 
previously noted, guarantees that the mean and overall 
swings will have the same distribution. It can, however, be 
relaxed considerably, by allowing the number of votes cast 
to vary from seat to seat and from election to election. Put 
formally:
Let Tn . be the number of formal votes cast in the ithOv
seat at the (t-l)th election.
Let T„ . be the number of formal votes cast in the ith 
li
seat at the tth election.
The overall swing (OS) is then given by:
(2.12) OS = [ ( Z B ^ . V Z ^ . ]  -
Define the population ratios, r  ^ and
Oi T0i'1T0i
li TU n T li
rH , by:
This gives:
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(2.13)
rii-(rii-roi
Since the values of and 2»  ^ are known, the term
l>(v 1^-vQi^i is a constant, say £. If it is assumed that
i ? ?n ? 9^ N(y^, a^ .) , it follows that OS v N(Zr^^y^-^,
i i
If y^ = y, £ = 1,2...n, the expected value of OS is given by 
y-£, since = 1 .  It is thus always possible to choose
values of the parameters y^ which will produce a given 
expected value of overall swing.
The preceding analyses are important, and are worth 
reiterating in point form:
(1) The model as developed is a generalization of the deter­
ministic formulation of the pendulum, and allows the 
probability of a particular division of the legislature 
(for a given expected value of overall swing) to be 
calculated.
(2) The assumption that swings in different seats are 
stochastically independent is fundamental, and will be 
satisfied if the polls close simultaneously in all seats.
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If the polls close at different times, the likelihood 
of a serious violation of the assumption will depend on 
the precise circumstances. In the case of Australian 
general elections, such a violation is unlikely to 
occur.
(3) The assumption that swing in each seat is identically 
normally distribution is convenient, but can be relaxed. 
For the model to be applied, it is only necessary that 
the distribution of swing in each seat be completely 
specified.
(4) The assumption that an equal number of votes are cast 
in each seat is adopted for simplicity, but can also be 
relaxed.
V
The model gives rise to measures of bias through simple
21adaptations of the techniques used by Butler and Brookes.
If Butler's approach is adopted, the parameters y . must be 
chosen so that (in association with the appropriate set of 
B^ ,s) the expected value of the overall vote for the govern­
ment is 0.5. Since in the absence of bias the expected 
proportion of seats for both parties would be 0.5, the 
deviation of the seats expectation of one party from 0.5 is 
an obvious measure of bias. Alternatively, the ratio of the 
probability of a government majority to the probability of an 
opposition majority can be used as a measure. The distinction
(72)
between the two is an important one. Consider the following 
diagram:
Diagram (2.1)
Seat Probability Distributions
0.5 E(A)
Proportion of seats 
won by government
This diagram shows two probability distributions of the 
total proportion of seats won, which the government might 
face with an expected overall vote proportion of 0.5. The 
first measure of bias shows the government better off under 
distribution B than under A, despite the fact that under B 
the opposition has a better chance of winning a majority than 
it has under A. In the light of the emphasis placed in this 
study on the significance of parties and partisan competition 
for governmental office, such a conclusion is clearly anom­
alous. The size of a majority is clearly less important to 
most parties than its existence. The second measure of bias
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takes this into account, and also has a particularly simple 
and straightforward interpretation, a value of, say, three 
implying that with an expected 50-50 division of the vote, 
the government has three times the opposition's chance of 
winning a majority in the House.
If Brookes's approach is adopted, two distributions
must be compared. The first is derived by choosing values
2 - -of y^ and so as to produce the same expected vote for
the government as that which it actually gained. The second
2is derived by choosing values of and so as to produce 
an expected vote for the opposition equal to that which the 
government actually gained. As with Butler's approach, either 
the expected values of the distributions or the derived 
probabilities of a majority for each party can be compared. 
Brookes's approach is more complicated than Butler's, and 
the benefits which make this worthwhile for him in his deter­
ministic model do not flow through to the probabilistic 
22approach. For these reasons, Butler's approach will be 
used from now on.
VI
The application of this measure involves two tasks. The 
first is the specification of the mean, variance and form of 
the distribution of swing in each constituency so as to 
produce an expected even division of the vote, and the cal­
culation of the probability of a government win in each seat. 
The second is the calculation of the probability of each 
possible division of the legislature, and thus the respective
(74)
probabilities of a government and opposition win.
If the first measure, based on the expected division of 
seats, is being used, the second of these tasks can be avoid­
ed (since, from expression (2.6), bias is given by Ep./n - 
0.5). The complete specification of the generalized binomial 
distribution required by the second measure is, however, 
quite easily derived, and the superiority of the second 
measure more than justifies the additional effort involved.
It will be recalled from expression (2.7) than p^ 
denotes the probability of a government win in the ith seat. 
Let p^ be the probability that the government wins exactly 
Y seats.
The generalized binomial distribution is a convolution
of n two-point distributions with different probabilities of
"success”, and for this reason no simple formula for its
23probability function can be given. There are, however, 
several ways of obtaining the desired probabilities. The 
first is to use the distribution's probability generating 
function:^
n n
(2.14) n(p.z+q ) = l p zY
i=1 1 * y=0 Y
The polynomial expression on the left-hand-side of (2.14)
can be expanded into the power series on the right-hand-side,
25and the p^s can then be obtained by inspection.
A simpler way of tackling the problem is to rely on the 
Central Limit Theorem. Fisz points out that as a corollary of
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the Lindeberg-Feller conditions, the generalized binomial
distribution function will asymptotically approach a normal
°° 26distribution function, if the series £p^ .q^ . is divergent.
£
This will be the case if p^ is bounded away from zero and
one; that is, if in even the safest seats for a party the
probability of a win by the other party is greater than some
very tiny constant. With a free ballot, this can clearly be
assumed. The number of seats won by the government, El
i
will therefore approach the normal distribution:
(2 . 15) P ri + N ^Pi- 2piqi), as n - » 
i i i
If £p^.q^ is divergent, the distribution also obeys the local
7- 27limit theorem, so that
(2 . 16) -i %i2;PY (2tt) 2(Zpiqi) 2exp{-%[('r-Zpi)/(Zpiqi) 2] “}
as n 00
These expressions do not by themselves convey any information
as to whether the normal distribution will be approached
slowly or quickly as n increases. An indication of the rate
28of convergence is given by Esseen’s Inequality. This 
expression is only formulated for sums of random variables 
with zero expectation, but this does not prevent its applic­
ation to the problem in hand. Since E(I _^) = , a simple
29transformation can be used. Let:
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A; = t* E(V  = °-
- E(A->
= p^i
C = Za2 n  ^ -z.
Fn<a> = p<c; V ; <a>
L = C~3/2ZE|A.I3 n n . 1 2, 1
- c;3/2^(p<-3p<2^ 3-2Pi4)
Esseen's Inequality states that:
(2.17) sup |F (a)-$(a)| < 0.7975L
a
where $(a) again is the standard normal distribution function.
The left-hand-side of (2.17) is equivalent to the maximum
difference between the distribution function of a generalized
binomial random variable with mean Ep^ . and variance
and the distribution function of a normal random variable
with the same mean and variance as the generalized binomial
30random variable. The right-hand-side of (2.17) is quite
?p
(77)
computationally simple to obtain.
The choice between explicit and asymptotic evaluation 
of the p^s must depend on the case under examination. When 
n is small, accuracy demands explicit calculation using the 
generating function. But as n increases, the procedure 
becomes more cumbersome and computationally expensive, while 
at the same time the quality of the asymptotic approximation 
improves. Esseen’s Inequality provides an estimate of the 
greatest possible error involved in using the normal approx­
imation, but the errors which actually occur may be well 
below the bound which it sets.
VII
We must now turn to the problem of specifying the form 
and parameters of the distribution of swing in each seat.
Form of Distribution of Swing
The following simple model implies that the assumption
of normally distributed swing is a reasonable one. Consider
the ith constituency. Let p^ be the probability that the nth
voter in the ith constituency votes for the government at a
specified election. If his or her vote is assumed to be
stochastically independent of the votes of other electors,
then the proportion of the vote polled by the government in
the ith. constituency will be a random variable with the
31generalized binomial distribution. If p^ is bounded away 
from zero and one for all n, the proportion of the vote 
polled by the government will be asymptotically normal. If
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these assumptions hold for two consecutive elections, the
32resulting swing will also be normally distributed.
This model is plausible without being beyond challenge. 
Few would quarrel with the postulate that p^ is bounded away 
from zero and one for all q, since the bounds could, in fact, 
be very close indeed to zero and one. The assumption that the 
votes of different people are independent is more debatable.
It is important to note, however, that the assumption is not 
violated if people's propensities to vote for a particular 
party are strongly influenced by the general political envir­
onment, or the propensities of other people to vote for that 
party. It is only violated if their propensities are depend­
ent on the actual votes of other people. When this distinct­
ion is borne in mind, it can be seen that many occurrences 
which apparently violate the independence condition in fact 
do not.
The strength of this formulation lies in the fact that
it specifies the way in which the distribution of swing in
each constituency is determined by the varying propensities
of the voters to support the government at the two elections
under consideration. There is also some empirical evidence
to support the assumption of normal swing. The "range of
swing" diagrams constructed by Mackerras for the Australian
general elections from 1961 to 1977 are either approximately
normal in shape, or can be viewed as mixtures of a number of
33normal distributions. Such a pattern could be expected to 
arise if swing had a normal probability distribution.
The formulation compares well with possible alternatives.
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The degenerate swing assumed when using the deterministic 
version of the pendulum has a demonstrably poor correspon­
dence with reality. The possible use of scaled beta distrib­
utions is rendered less attractive by the considerable
sensitivity of such distributions to changes in their para- 
3 A-meters, and has no particular theoretical justification.
The normality assumption also greatly simplifies 
computation, since the standard normal distribution function 
is included in many computer packages. For all of these 
reasons, the normality of swing will henceforth be taken for 
granted.
Mean and Variance of Swing
Before discussing in detail the derivation of these 
parameters, it is useful to state precisely the purpose of 
the exercise. If bias at the tth election is to be measured, . 
a simulation must be performed for each constituency of the 
probability distribution of the government's share of the 
vote which would have prevailed had the expected division of 
the overall vote been 50-50. The most obvious way of doing 
this is by drawing inferences from the swings which actually 
occurred at the tth election about the probability distrib­
utions which produced the observed overall vote, and adjust­
ing the inferred parameters uniformly so as to produce the 
desired expected overall vote. Such a technique clearly 
involves a ceteris -paribus assumption, but this is inevitable. 
The justification for such an assumption lies in the fact 
that the act of inferring the parameters of the swings from
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those which actually occurred utilizes the only empirical 
information about the distinctive swing pattern at the tth 
election which will be available in all cases. To distort 
the information so derived by adjusting the parameters non- 
uniformly would thus introduce an undesirably arbitrary 
element into the analysis.
The inference problem can be attacked in a number of 
ways. It might be thought tempting to assume a priori that 
the distributions are the same in certain sub-groups of 
constituencies, but this approach encounters fatal difficul­
ties. If such an a priori assumption is not to be quite 
arbitrary, it must be based on some model incorporating the 
variables on the basis of which the grouping of the constit­
uencies is to be done. For example, an assumption that S^. v
2 2 N(y^, a ) in metropolitan seats, and that ^ N(y ^ > a ) in
non-metropolitan seats can be equivalently expressed in the
form:
(2.18) , i — 1,2. . .n
e. -v. N(0, o2) , i =
ECe^ep =0, i + 3
where X. is an indicator variable which takes a value of one
in metropolitan seats, and a value of zero in non-metropolitan
35seats, so that y^ = and = 3g • Now (2.18) is
merely a very simple version of the general linear regression
(81)
model, which takes the form 36
(2.19) S. = 3n+ I 3 .X. .+e. , i = 1,2. . . 0 j = 1 3 %
e^  v N (0 , c ), i = 1,2...n
E (e^ e^ .) = 0, i f 3
where the m X.^s are explanatory variables, which may be 
qualitative or quantitative. It is convenient at this point 
to shift to matrix notation, with matrix and vector quan­
tities denoted by a over upper and lower case letters 
37respectively. Let:
s = ~ sr , X = " 1 X11 • • • x„ r , 3 =
1--0oaL__
S2 1 X12 ' • • Xm2 h
- Sn - _ 1 Xln ' • . Xmn -
-------
1
. 
• 
cn5
_______
1
e2
eL n J
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The model of (2.19) can then be written in matrix notation:
(2.20) s = X3+e
e ^ N (0, a2I)
where I is the identity matrix. The vector of regression
coefficients, 3, is unknown, and will typically be estimated
38by the method of least-squares. The least-squares esti-
/s
mator of 3 is denoted by 3, and from it can be derived an
39unbiased estimator of the swing vector, given by:
✓N. A
(2.21) s = X3
This estimator is a random variable with the multivariate 
normal distribution:^
A
(2.22) s v N{X3, a2[X(X,X)"1X ,+l] }
where X' denotes the transpose of the matrix X.^ Now the
A
variance-covariance matrix of s will not in general be 
A- 2diagonal, and from this it follows that the individual
A
~  A  / o
elements of s, the S^ .s, are not stochastically independent.
Any attempt to use them as the basis for the simulation of
voting patterns for the purpose of measuring bias would thus
violate the essential preconditions for the application of
44the generalized binomial distribution.
There are basically two ways around this problem. The
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first involves retaining the assumption that the distrib­
utions of swing can vary from seat to seat, but abandoning 
the attempt to infer their parameters by postulating a 
relationship with explanatory variables. However, if this 
approach is adopted, the swing which actually occurs in the
£th seat at the tth election, S. , becomes the sole basis^a
for the estimation of . Now in this situation can be
5 2viewed as a sample mean, and therefore S^. ^ N(y^, o In').
But in this case, n is equal to one, so is a very high- 
variance estimator. This is bad enough, but worse still, 
there is no way of estimating the variances of the distrib­
utions in each seat. This line of attack therefore fails.
The second involves making the assumption that swing
2is identically distributed in every seat, ^ N(y, a ). 
This is equivalent to the linear model:
(2.23) = y+e^, £ = l,2...n
e£ v N(0, a^), £ = 1,2...n
E (e^ej) =0, £ f o
The least-squares predictor of S^. is the mean swing at the 
tth election:
S . = ES . /n
Is »Is
(2.24)
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The difference between this predictor and the random variable 
S. is itself a random variable
(2.25) S^-S. 'X. N{0, [(n+l)/n]a2l
2Since a is unknown, it must be replaced by the residual 
47variance:
(2.26) c2 = I(S . -S. )2/n-la . v a -^a
If n-l>30, this implies that: ®
(2.27)
A A Q
S^-S^ V N{0 , [(n+l)/rc] c/}
Denote the least-squares predictor of the vote for the
government in the ith seat at the tth election by:
(2.28)
/ \  A
V. = B.-S.
Z V 'L
Since V. = B^ -S^ ., it follows that:
(2.29) V.-V. = B.-S.-(B.-S.)
= s . - s .
(85)
Therefore:
(2.30) Vi- h  ^ N{0, [(n+l)/n]o^}
The analysis to this point has been merely concerned 
with drawing inferences about the distributions underlying 
the swings which actually occurred at the tth election, and 
has therefore been firmly grounded in the rules of statist­
ical inference. Such a basis cannot be provided for the 
next stage of the analysis - the simulation of distributions 
which will produce an expected even division of the overall 
vote - because the simulated distributions are hypothetical 
constructs, which by their very nature have no real-world 
equivalents to which they can be compared. For this reason, 
there can be no single, objectively correct, simulated
distribution, and the simulation procedure must inevitably
49have some overtones of thumomancy. One way to proceed is 
as follows:
The overall vote for the government at the tth election 
is given by:
(2.31) OV = Er. .V
and it exceeds 0.5 by:
(2.32)
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which can be estimated by:
(2.33) d = Er .V . -0.5. 1 ^  v
'i
Now:
(2.34) E C f 3i(V.a-da>] =0.5
and therefore (V^ -d ) is a suitable value for \i'l, the mean 
of the simulated distribution in the ith seat. The variance 
can be specified in a number of ways. It might be thought
/\ A
desirable to treat Var(V^-d-V^+d) as the variance of the 
simulated distribution, but this turns out to be extremely
/A A
awkward to manipulate, because Vk , d, , and d are not 
stochastically independent; furthermore, the specification
/V JU
of (V^ -d ) as the value of is an arbitrary one, and is 
not based on any belief that (V^.-d) is in some sense the
JU
"true" value of . For these reasons, it is convenient 
simply to assume that the variance of the simulated distrib­
utions is equal to the variance of the inferred distribution 
of the swing which actually occurred, that is:
(2.35) a?* = Q n + l ) / n ] a ^
On this basis, the distribution of the simulated vote is 
given by:
(87)
(2.36) V* -v. N(u*. o \* )
and p^ , the simulated probability of a government win in the 
ith seat, is given by:
(2.37) p* = l-*ll(0.5-y*)/o{*]
= l-«C(^2iB.-B.)/a.*]
It is worth recalling that four main assumptions under­
lie this simulation. The first is that n-l>30; it allows us 
to use the normal, rather than the t distribution, in the
JU
calculation of p^; this greatly simplifies computation. The
assumption is satisfied in the vast majority of legislatures
to which the measure could be applied.
The second is that swing is identically distributed in
every seat. This is a rather restrictive condition, and is
imposed purely because more general assumptions are excluded
for technical reasons. There will be situations in which the
2specification that ^ N(y, c ) is closely matched by 
r e a l i t y , a n d  the simulations will be more convincing in 
such cases than in those where a more complex swing pattern 
is manifested.
The third is that an adequate simulation of y^ can be 
conducted by altering the location parameter of the under­
lying distribution by the same quantity in all seats. As has 
already been pointed out, the justification for this is 
essentially negative: there is no empirical basis for
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altering the parameters in a different way, and the decision 
to change them uniformly is adopted by default and reflects 
the uncertainties inherent in the situation. The most that 
can be claimed for this approach is a certain plausibility, 
and even this will depend very much on the case under cons­
ideration. Suppose, for example, that it is desired to 
simulate the probability distributions associated with an 
expected even division of the overall vote at the 1966 Aust­
ralian general election. Such an expectation implicitly 
postulates political circumstances which differ radically 
from those which actually prevailed, in a way which is . 
inherently unknowable . Simulations so derived cannot carry 
much conviction.
The fourth is that the variance of the simulated
2distributions is equal to o^*. Since the simulated distrib­
utions are hypothetical constructs, this assumption is 
untestable. The reasons for its adoption are again negative; 
it embodies the fact that we cannot be more certain about 
the location of V. than about the location of V..
In conclusion, it can be stated that the specification 
of the parameters of the simulated distributions is the most 
vulnerable aspect of the techniques developed in this chapter. 
This, however, is a consequence not of the nature of the 
techniques, but of the nature of the problem towards the 
solution of which they are directed. A simulation of an event 
which has not taken place cannot be objectively "correct”; 
the most that can be achieved is credibility. Our simulated 
distributions will be most credible when they are produced
(89)
by very minor adjustments to the inferred distributions, 
(that is, when the tth election is very closely contested 
in terms of votes), and when the swing pattern at the tth 
election suggests an identical underlying distribution of 
swing in all constituencies. When these conditions are not 
fulfilled, the techniques can still be applied, but the 
resulting figures will not be meaningful measures of bias as 
we have defined it. This qualification must always be borne 
in mind.
VIII
The techniques developed up to this point are applied 
in the following example, in which estimates are made of the 
level of bias at the 1980 Australian general election. The 
basic data used are Mackerras's estimates of the two-party
52preferred vote in each seat at the 1977 and 1980 elections, 
and the figures derived are obtained through the use of the 
computer programs set out in Appendices II and III. In 
particular, it is found that:
a?* = 0.0009258
Sr,.B.. 1 'l V t,
0.5471
Ep^ = 68.08
* * = 6.911
i
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0.7975L = 0.2004n
The following table sets out individual and cumulative 
probabilities of the government's winning the number of seats 
set out in the first column, calculated using the probability 
generating function and the normal approximation. In using 
the normal approximation, a continuity correction is 
applied.^
Y57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
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Table (2.2)
P<“ r£-*>
(actual)
P(ZIri=Y) 
(approx.)
P(ZIri<Y)
(actual)
P<ZIri<Y) 
(approx.)
.00002 .00003 .00002 .00003
.00011 .00012 .00013 .00015
.00043 .00040 .00056 .00055
.00143 .00142 .00199 .00197
.00418 .00418 .00617 .00615
.01064 .01073 .01681 .01688
.02354 .02386 .04035 .04074
.04530 .04589 .08565 .08663
.07578 .07655 .16143 .16318
.11010 .11073 .27153 .27391
.13877 .13878 .41030 .41269
.15156 .15078 .56186 .56347
.14329 .14197 .70515 .70544
.11710 .11592 .82225 .82136
.08263 .08199 .90488 .90335
.05027 .05009 .95515 .95364
.02633 .02674 .98148 .98038
.01185 .01232 .99333 .99270
.00458 .00491 .99791 .99761
.00152 .00170 .99943 .99931
.00043 .00051 .99986 .99982
.00010 .00013 .99996 .99995
.00002 .00004 .99998 .99999
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It can be seen from the table that in this case the 
quality of the normal approximation is very good, with the 
differences between columns four and five all well within 
the Esseen bound. The value of our first measure of bias 
(with an expected even division of the overall vote) is 
simply the difference between the expected proportion of 
seats won by the government and 0.5. In this case, the 
expected proportion of seats won by the government is equal 
to 68.08/125, that is, 0.5446, so the value of the measure 
is 0.0446.
The value of the second measure is the ratio of the 
probability of a government majority to the probability of 
an opposition majority. Using actual probabilities, this is 
equal to 0.98319/0.01681, that is, 58.488; using the normal 
approximation, it is equal to 0.98312/0.01688, that is,
58.242.
These are striking figures indeed. Some caution is 
required in their interpretation, because they are based on 
error-prone estimates of two-party preferred votes, and 
because the assumption of identically distributed swing in 
1980 does not seem entirely convincing;^  nevertheless, the 
simulated probabilities of a government win in the various 
seats are basically plausible in the light of the actual 
outcome in 1980, and the bias figures are so large as to 
provide strong support for complaints voiced by the Opposition 
Leader when the result of the election became known.
The main point of this example, however, is simply to 
demonstrate that meaningful and useful figures can be easily
(93)
obtained through the use of comparatively simple computer 
programs. The GLIM package, which has achieved widespread 
international acclaim, is a particularly elegant tool for 
electoral analysis, because data are stored internally in 
vector form. Calculations which in bygone days would have 
been extremely cumbersome can now be performed with the 
greatest of ease. It cannot be said of this measure that it 
is too complicated to be useful.
IX
So far consideration has been given to situations in 
which there are only two parties, each of which contests 
every seat. The possibility of widening this perspective 
must now be examined.
The techniques developed up to this point can be divided 
into three categories. The first encompasses the simulation 
of the probability distributions of the outcomes in the 
various constituencies which will produce a given expected 
division of the overall vote. The second embraces the deriv­
ation from these of the probability distribution of the 
total number of seats won by a given party. The third covers 
the subsequent derivation of measures of bias.
Of these categories, the second is quite unaffected by 
a wider perspective. If the probability of a win by a given 
party is known for each seat, the total number of seats which 
it wins will have the generalized binomial distribution, 
regardless of the number of parties. This is most easily
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confirmed by noting that the total number of seats won by 
the Zth party can be expressed as the sum of n indicator 
variables I ^  which take a value of one when the Zth party 
wins the ith seat, and a value of zero otherwise.
The relaxation of the two-party assumption does, how­
ever, make necessary a modification of the methods used to 
simulate the probability distributions of the vote in each 
seat. Furthermore, it is worth emphasising at the outset 
that the problems which arise in the two-party model when 
the simulations necessitate large adjustments of the inferred 
distribution parameters are multiplied in a £-party situation. 
Simulations of, say, the probability distributions associated 
with an expected overall vote of 0.5 for the Australian 
Democrats at the 1980 Australian general election must 
inevitably lack any worthwhile empirical basis, since they 
are predicated on the occurrence of unknowable events. For 
this reason a number of analysts simply proceed by ignoring 
"minor" parties, and concentrating on the position of two 
opposing "major" parties. In Australia, this approach is 
associated with the work of Rydon and Mackerras; in the 
United Kingdom, with the work of Kendall and Stuart, Butler 
and Steed; in New Zealand with the work of McRobie and 
R o b e r t s . U n d e r  plurality voting, it takes the form of the 
calculation of "two-party" swings; under preferential voting, 
it takes the form of the calculation of "two-party preferred 
votes". Regardless of the system of scrutiny, the approach 
can only be sustained if the distinction between "major" and 
"minor" parties can be clearly established. In the United
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Kingdom, the smaller parties have increased both in numbers 
and political influence since Steed proposed the use of two- 
party swings, and with the rise of the Social Democrats the 
continued viability of a two-party analysis is very doubtful. 
The rise of Social Credit in New Zealand creates similar 
analytical difficulties.
5 6In Australia, as Mackerras emphasises, the state of 
party competition (at least at the federal level) is some­
what more clear-cut. His approach comes under attack from 
two quite different directions. Rydon, while generally sym­
pathetic with Mackerras’s work, notes a number of potential 
sources of error in the notional allocation of undistributed 
preferences."^ A more fundamental criticism comes from 
Sharman,"^ and from Mayer. They reject what they see as a 
desire to reduce a complex pattern of political and electoral 
competition to simple dichotomies:
"Mackerras and those who uncritically use his two- 
party preferred vote and the pendulum again and 
again3 seem unaware of how they have fashioned an 
Iron Maiden which crushes the minor parties and
independents till they yield nought hut prefer-„ 60ences .
This, however, can be read not so much as a criticism of 
particular analytical devices, but as a criticism of the 
psephological Weltanschauung which their use in a particular 
way might reflect. On this basis it is possible to concede 
that Mayer's arguments have some validity, without renouncing 
the use of the two-party preferred vote. In particular, there
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is a case to be made for its retention as a useful concept
in the analysis of the seats-votes relationship.
Such a case rests on two general propositions. The first
is that when it comes to determining the division of the
federal lower house in Australia, votes for minor parties
61are only significant as preferences. The second is that 
because of the impossibility of conducting plausible simul­
ations, there is simply little that can usefully be said 
about bias against minor parties, and as a consequence 
attention must be confined to two major parties.
It might be argued that undistributed preferences should 
simply be ignored, rather than notionally allocated. This, 
however, would be tantamount to notionally allocating all 
undistributed preferences to the losing party in the seat in 
question. Since in the model, the two-party preferred vote 
acts as an indicator of the relative safety of seats, this 
would clearly have a distorting effect.
Finally on this point, it must be emphasised that an 
acceptance of these propositions is quite consistent with 
a belief that votes for minor parties are important phenomena 
which deserve recognition and detailed investigation.
There will, however, be situations in which three or
more parties, each capable of winning seats, compete elect-
6 2orally. To deal with such cases, new notation is needed.
The problem can be simplified somewhat by noting that since 
the proportions of the formal vote polled by all candidates 
in a seat sum to one, the outcome in a seat contested by £ 
candidates can be represented by a (£-l)xl vector, and by
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6 3a point in (c-1) dimensional space. Theoretically it does
6 4not matter which candidate is omitted from the vector; in 
practice it is best to omit the candidate of a party which 
contests every seat. Specifically, let:
38) b  . = ~ b k
II>
I
i—1 
>l __
B 2  i V 2 i
_ _ _  V ( C - l ) i  _
be vectors of proportions of the vote gained in the ith 
seat by (£-1) candidates at the (t-l)th and tth elections 
respectively. Once again, b^ is a vector of known constants 
(some of which may be equal to zero), while v^ is a random 
vector. Furthermore, let:
(2.39) si = b^ .-v^
By analogy with the two-party case, it will be assumed that 
s^  ^ N(y, Z) for all i, with Z a diagonal matrix. From this 
it follows that v^ v N(b^ .-]i, Z) .
Again by analogy with the two-party case, if the
number of seats contested by the Zth party, is greater than 
thirty for all l, the distribution of the least-squares 
predictor of v^ can be obtained from the expression:
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(2.40) v.-^ ^ N (°> Z)
where Z is a diagonal matrix whose Zth diagonal element is 
equal to \^ (n^ +l) !n^\ , where is the sample variance of
the actually observed changes in the Zth party's share of 
the vote at the tth election.
The overall vote for the Z-th party is given by:
<2-41> 0Vi - f u Vli
and the extent to which this differs from 1/c can be esti­
mated by:
( 2 - 4 2 )  &la =  Z.rH VUa - a / w h e r e  Vlia=hli-(Z.Slia/nl)Is ^
M 65Now:
(2.«) EC = < ^ )
/N /S JU
So ) i-s a suitable value for y^, the mean of the
simulated distribution of the vote for the Zth party in the 
-Zth seat. Putting the least-squares predictors into obvious 
vector notation, the distribution of the simulated vote, yet 
again analogously with the two-party case, is given by:
v* * N(y*. Z)(2.44)
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With plurality voting, the simulated probability of a win by
grating the multivariate density function implied by this
1- Z V - ., m = 1,2...(£-1), m f I.
1=1
Under preferential voting, the situation is rather more 
complex, because a ballot paper can be marked in £! rather 
than c distinct ways. However, a considerable simplification 
can be achieved by considering only first preferences in the 
construction of simulated distributions, while taking account 
of the preferential system in constructing limits of integ­
ration. As a very simple example of how this can be done, 
consider a seat contested by the Liberal Party, ALP and DLP, 
in which the simulated distribution is such that the DLP is 
certain to run third in the count of first preferences.
Assume further that 85% of DLP preferences go to the Liberal 
candidate. From this is follows that the ALP candidate will 
win the seat if and only if:
the Zth party in the ith seat, p ^ ,  can be obtained by inte-
(2.45)
that is, if and only if:
(2.46) VALP > 0-4595-0.15V'LIB
This inequality gives the appropriate regions over which 
integration must be performed.
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If the Zth party contests the tth election but not the 
(t-l)th, this fact is incorporated in the model by letting
take a value of zero. If the (t-l)th election is contest­
ed, but the tth is not, the probabilities of wins by the 
other parties are obtained by integrating the simulated
conditional multivariate density function associated with a
6 6swing against the Zth party equal to B^.
It must be emphasised again that the limitations which 
affect the two-party model affect the c-party model in a
magnified form. In particular, a large value of any element
/\
of d^ will severely limit the value of the figures derived.
Finally, it must be noted that in the £-party situation, 
a single measure of bias cannot be easily defined. Rather, 
bias must be investigated by the pairwise comparison of the 
simulated generalized binomial distributions for each party.
X
The progress made in this chapter towards the develop­
ment of an acceptable technique for measuring bias can now 
be summarized in point form:
(1) A probabilistic measure of bias can be developed from 
the postulate that the proportion of the vote polled by 
a given party in each constituency is an independent 
random variable.
(2) If the probability distributions of these variables are 
specified, the probability distribution of the total
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number of seats won by the given party can also be 
obtained. This distribution, the generalized binomial, 
is asymptotically normal.
(3) Bias is best measured by the ratio of the probability 
of a government legislative majority to the probability 
of an opposition legislative majority, associated with 
an expected even division of the overall vote.
(4) It is possible to simulate probability distributions of 
the vote in each seat which will produce an expected 
even division of the overall vote, by uniformly adjust­
ing parameters of distributions inferred from the swing 
actually observed at the election under consideration. 
The simulated distributions cannot be objectively 
correct, but they can be plausible.
(5) The process of drawing inferences from the observed 
swing is based on the assumption that swing is identic­
ally normally distributed in every seat. This assumption 
is frequently unrealistic, but is unavoidable.
(6) If large adjustments to the parameters are required, the 
simulations will not be very realistic. This limits the 
usefulness of the measure to elections which are fairly 
closely contested in terms of the overall vote.
(7) The techniques can be extended to a multi-party
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Situation, but at the cost of a considerable increase 
in their complexity.
(8) Subject to these qualifications, a useful and easily 
interpreted measure of bias has been developed.
(103)
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Heathcote, Probability: Elements of the Mathematical 
Theory, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1971, pp 104-5'.
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, s. 136(7). In the 
event of a tied count, the Divisional Returning 
Officer is given a casting vote.
Heathcote, Probability: Elements of the Mathematical 
Theory, pp 35, 104.
Ibid., p 32, explains in detail the notation used in 
expressions (2.4) and (2.5).
M. Fisz, Probability Theory and Mathematical Statistics ,
3rd ed., Wiley, New York, 1963, pp 134-5. The general­
ized binomial distribution is frequently referred to as
Poisson 's binomial.
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Chapter Three - Analyses based on Regression
I
In this chapter measures of bias based on the methods 
of regression analysis are examined. Initially two meanings 
attached to the term "regression" are noted. A measure of 
bias is then derived from the application of the two-variable 
linear regression model, and the assumptions underlying that 
model are analysed one by one; it is noted that violations 
of some of them can be handled using generalized least- 
squares estimators. It is further observed that measures of 
bias based on prediction distributions of the dependent 
variable conditional upon hypothesized values of the predic­
tor variable well outside the observed range of values of the 
predictor variable carry very little weight. It is pointed 
out that this fact imposes limits upon the types of situat- . 
ions which can usefully be analysed using the regression 
model. Finally, a numerical example is given of the measure 
in action. It is argued that the regression model constitutes 
a useful way of approaching the bias measurement problem.
II
In the statistical literature, the term "regression" 
is used in two different senses. In the first, the "regress­
ion curve" is, for the two-variable case, "the locus of the 
means of the conditional distributions whose densities are
given by f(y|x)".  ^This definition is easily extended to the
2discrete and multivariate cases.
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In the second, the "regression line" is that fitted to
3a set of data points by the method of least-squares. It is 
important to note, however, that the use of the linear model 
and the method of least-squares does not imply that the 
dependent variable is in actual fact the sum of deterministic 
and stochastic components. The linear formulation is no more 
than a model, and the usual:
(3.1) PSt = eo+3lOV*+V  t = 1,2 ...s
e^ v N(0, a^), t = 1,2...z 
E(eget) = 0 , 8 f t
is equivalent to:
(3.2) PSt ^ N(ß0+S1OVt> o2). = 1,2...s
Under such a specification, the problem of obtaining least- 
squares estimators of (3q and 3^  is equivalent to that of 
obtaining maximum likelihood estimators.^” The application of 
the linear model is thus quite consistent with the argument 
advanced in Chapter One that with single-member constituen­
cies there can be no deterministic relationship between seats 
and votes.
The first definition of regression is of theoretical 
rather than practical importance, since full information
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about the underlying conditional distributions will not 
generally be available.^ For this reason attention is focus­
ed for the rest of this chapter upon the two-variable linear 
regression model.
Ill
In a number of analyses in the past, straight lines
6 - . -have been fitted to seats-votes data. The most detailed ' 
exposition of this procedure as a technique for measuring 
bias is given by Tufte.^ All use, among others, the model 
of (3.1), and it thus deserves detailed examination. In 
this context OV , which is assumed to be a fixed number
Ly
g
rather than a random variable, represents the proportion of 
the overall vote polled by the party under examination at the 
tth election. PS represents the proportion of legislative 
seats gained by the party under examination at that election. 
The parameter 3-^ Is known as the swing ratio.
For given sets of OV s and PS s, the least-squares 
estimators of the unknown regression parameters Bq and 
are given by:^
(3.3) ft = [sEOV PS -(ZOV )(EPS )]/QsZOV^-(ZOV )2]
t t t t t
(3.4) ß0 = PS-^ÖV
where PS = EPS,/z , and ÖV = ZOV /s, and z is the number of 
t t t t
data points.
(121)
The variance parameter g is also unknown, but can be 
estimated by the residual variance:^
(3.5)
Once values of these estimators are obtained, confid­
ence intervals for the parameters and prediction intervals ■ 
for values of PS can be established.
Consider first the strict two-party case. It is immed­
iately obvious that bias as we have defined it can only be
present if 3q 7^ 0. This makes it possible to set up a statis-
11tical test for the presence of bias.
12The test statistic, given by:
has the t distribution with (z-2) degrees of freedom. The 
value of this statistic can be compared with appropriately 
chosen critical points of the t distribution to test the 
null hypothesis that 3q = 0 against a specified alternative 
hypothesis.
To obtain a measure of, rather than a test for the 
presence of, bias, it is necessary to derive the distribution 
of the difference between PS^, the proportion of the seats 
won by the party under consideration with a proportion of the
overall vote equal to 6, and its predictor PS^. J. Johnston 
shows that if the estimated linear relationship can be assumed
(3.6) f = {ß0 [3Z(OVt-OV)2]%}/[a(£OV^)%] 
t t
(122)
to hold for OV^ = 6, then:
Is
A Q A A A
(3.7) PS6-PS6 -v N (0, a W) , where PSg = ß0+ß16
and W = {l+(l/s)+[(6-ÖV)2/Z(OVt-ÜV)2] }
13
2 ~2 Since a is unknown, it must be replaced by a . As a
14consequence,
(3.8) g = (PS^pl^/fhw)1]
has the t distribution with (s-2) degrees of freedom. It 
follows that:
(3.9) P(PS6<0.5) = P(g<{ (0.5-PSä)/[a(W)%]>)
This probability can easily be evaluated using tables of the
integral of the t distribution, some of which are provided
16by Yule and Kendall. It is thus possible to determine the 
probability of a legislative majority for a party, associated 
with a particular value of 6. The arguments put forward in 
Section V of Chapter Two can be used in the two-party case 
to justify the use as a measure of bias of the ratio of the 
probability of a government majority to the probability of an 
opposition majority when 6=0.5. In a multi-party situation, 
it is again rather pointless to attempt to define a single 
measure of bias; it is best to proceed as before by pairwise
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comparisons of the prediction distributions for different 
parties associated with a common value of 6. This can be 
done within an interval estimation or hypothesis testing 
framework.^
Finally, it should be noted that the variance of the
__ 2prediction distribution is directly related to (6-OV) . This
implies a widening of the prediction intervals for PS^ as 6 
diverges from OV; as a consequence, it may prove difficult 
to obtain any worthwhile comparisons between the positions 
of "major" and "minor" parties.
IV
The analysis of Section III has eight main features 
which must be examined in detail. They are:
(1) The use of only one explanatory variable, OV.
(2) The specification of a linear relationship between 
E(PSt) and OV^.
(3) The assumption that the disturbance term, e , is 
normally distributed.
(4) The assumption that E(e^) = 0.
(5) The assumption that E(e^) = a^ for all t.
The assumption that E(e e+) =0, s f t.
S s(6)
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(7) The assumption that the OV s are fixed numbers.
Is
(8) The assumption that the fitted model is valid for the 
specified value of 5.
These will be dealt with one by one:
The use of only one explanatory variable
This approach is adopted as a consequence of our defin­
ition of bias. It is possible to regress the seat proportion
achieved on other explanatory variables, such as, for example,
18the number of seats contested by a party, and such a
regression is defensible if the aim of the exercise is to
explain as much of the variation in PS as is possible. But
in this case the aim of the exercise is to discover whether
the probability distribution of PS conditional upon a
particular value of OV differs from party to party. As Gudgin
and Taylor point out, to include extra variables is to relate
19seat proportions to some notion of an effective vote.
However, the norms set out in Section VI of Chapter One 
relate to the relationship between seats and shares of the 
overall vote; differences in the effective vote (as the term 
is used by Gudgin and Taylor) themselves constitute causes 
of bias as we have defined it. To include extra variables in 
the regression is therefore to abstract from such causes; for 
our purposes this is self-defeating. The use of OV as the 
sole explanatory variable is therefore necessary.
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The specification of a linear relationship between E(PS,.)
is
and 0VX
Is
The model of (3.1) is adopted because of its simplicity,
and because it has been found in a number of studies to
20provide a good fit to the data. It has the disadvantage
that there is no guarantee that the fitted line will pass
through the points (0,0) and (1,1). Tufte notes that this
21problem can be rectified by fitting a logit model:
(3.10) loge[PSt/(l-PSt)3 = b0+b1loge Q0Vt/(l-0Vp3+ei;
et^ N(0, a2) , t = 1,2. . .3 
E (e^ep = 0, s ^ i
This model encounters a number of difficulties. Tufte finds
that it fits the data no better than model (3.1); since the
logit relationship is almost linear for the values of OV
22encountered in his data, this is hardly surprising.
A more subtle defect is pointed out by Linehan and 
Schrodt. They observe that (3.10) is merely a logged version 
of the relationship:
(3.11) PSt/(l-PSt) = exp(b0) . [0Vt/(l-0Vt)]bl.ut
where u^ = exp(e^), and that as a consequence (3.10) implies 
a multiplicative log-normally distributed disturbance term
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in the stochastic seats-votes relationship. 23
Such a disturbance specification is quite untenable in
2 A*this context. Haworth and Vincent show that under (3.11), 
the variance of the conditional distribution of PS/ (1-PS) 
given 0V/(1-0V) is proportional to the square of the condit­
ional expectation of PS/(1-PS) given OV/(1-OV). They further 
demonstrate that unless b^ = -°°, or b^ < 0, the conditional
expectation of PS/(1-PS) approaches infinity as OV approaches 
25one. So, therefore, must the conditional variance of 
PS/ (1-PS).
But in fact as OV gets closer to one, a deterministic 
situation is approached in which the party under consider­
ation wins all the seats, and in which the conditional 
variance of PS/(1-PS) given OV/(1-OV) is therefore equal to 
zero. The model of (3.11) thus is inconsistent with reality.
This problem can be avoided by specifying an additive, 
normally distributed disturbance term in (3.11), but such a 
specification makes necessary the use of approximate estim­
ators obtained using an iterative computer algorithm.
Linehan and Schrodt provide estimates so obtained, but note
that the algorithm they use does not guarantee the achieve-
2 6ment of a global minimum sum-of-squares. Furthermore, they 
are forced to rely on Monte Carlo methods to derive approx­
imate distributions of their estimators for the purpose of
27hypothesis testing.
The complications introduced by such procedures are 
quite unnecessary. The linear fit closely approximates to 
the logit relationship, at least in the region of OV^ = 0.5,
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and the two only differ importantly if an extrapolation to 
a value of OV far away from OV is being attempted. But as 
will be shown when considering assumption (8), such extra­
polations are of dubious validity for other reasons. 
Furthermore, Tufte only gives a logit model for the two- 
party case, whereas the linear model can be estimated party 
by party, allowing a pairwise comparison of the regressions 
obtained.
For all these reasons, model (3.1) deserves to be 
regarded as suitable for the task in hand.
The assumption that the disturbance term, e is normally 
distributed
This is the usual assumption made when drawing inferen­
ces about parameters of the general linear model. In this 
case, it can be justified by reference to the model of 
Chapter Two. Provided that there exists for each seat a 
probability, bounded between zero and one, and conditional 
upon a value of OV, of a win by the party under consideration, 
and provided that the votes gained by that party in the 
various seats are independent, PS will be asymptotically 
normally distributed. It will be recalled that the empirical 
calculations in Section VIII of Chapter Two strongly suggest 
that the quality of this approximation is very good. The 
grounds for adopting the assumption of normality in this
case are therefore much stronger than the vague appeals to
2 8the Central Limit Theorem which are typically offered.
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The assumption that E(e^) = 0 .
This is an obvious assumption given the two which pre­
cede it. As Kendall and Stuart point out, it matters not if
it be assumed that E(e ) is some constant, since this can be
29absorbed by a change in the intercept parameter . If, 
however, E(e.) is not a constant, the specification of a
~D
linear relationship between E(PS^) and OV cannot easily be 
maintained. For this reason, the assumption that E(e ) = Ö 
simplifies the model, and is therefore desirable.
2 2The assumption that E(e^) = a for all t--------------------- A------------------------------------------------------------------------
That this is strictly speaking an unrealistic assumption
follows from the arguments presented against model (3.11).
2 30As OV approaches zero or one, E(e ) must approach zero.
Under such circumstances, ordinary least-squares estimators
are inefficient, and it is necessary to use generalized
31least-squares estimators. If:
y = - p s r , X = ' 1 O Vp " , 8 =
IooaI___ , e = e l
p s 2 1 0 V 2 L  ßj. J e 2
PSL- S - 1 OVU z - eL 3 J
the generalized least-squares model can be written as:
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(3.12) y = Xß+e
e v N (0, g 2^)
where S] is a known positive definite diagonal matrix whose 
fth diagonal element is a function of OV^. The generalized 
least-squares estimator of 3, given by:
A
(3.13) ß~ = (X,^"1X)"1X ’^ "1y
~ 3 2is a minimum variance unbiased linear estimator of ß . It
33is normally distributed:
A
(3.14) ß* ^ N[0, a2 (X'ß"1X)"1]
The distribution of the difference between PSq ^ , the pro­
portion of the seats won by the party under consideration 
with 50% of the overall vote, and its generalized least-
A
squares predictor, PSq ^ , must now be obtained. Let 
Xq  ^ = {1 0.5}. Then:
(3.15) '0.5 5ß+e0.5
and:
(3.16)
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SO :
(3.17) 5 PS0 e0.5 x0.5^
Now:
O  . 1-8) E<PS0.5‘plo.5> = °
and
A
(3.19) Var(PSQ 5-p"sq 5) = Var(e0 5)+Var(x^ 5$*) 
since e„ r is independent of the e^,e 2 -..e2 values influenc-
~jJ- ~ ~ 24ing 3 , and Xq ^3 is a constant. Therefore:
(3.20) Var(PSQ 5-PSQ 5) = a2 [wQ 5+x^ 5 (X’fi^X)'1x0 5] 
2where a wn r is the variance of PS. associated with a value U . j o
of 5 of 0.5. For convenience, the right-hand-side of (3.20)
2can be written as o G .
A
Now (PSq 5 ~PSq )^ , being a linear combination of normal
35random variables, is itself normally distributed, and the 
usual shift to the t distribution gives:
h = (PS0 5-PS0 5)/[o(G)%] *(3.21)
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where
/s /\
(3.22) a2 = [(y-Xg*) ’n'hy-Xß*)] / (s-2)
From (3.21), the probability of a legislative majority for
the party under consideration can be calculated. Before
these calculations can be made, fi must be specified. One
0/2 - -simple specification is that:
(3.23) w = OV (1-OV )
This satisfies the condition that w approach zero as OV 
approaches zero or one, but involves only small changes in 
as OV varies in the region of 0.5. The values of 
associated with values of OV of 0.4 and 0.6 are equal to 
96% of the value of w associated with a value of OV of 
0.5.
This shows that it is possible to produce a specific­
ation of which satisfies the condition that Var(PS^) 
approach zero as 0V^ approaches zero or one, but which will 
lead to much the same estimates as are obtained using ordin­
ary least-squares. In practice, if the values of 0V in use
ü
cluster around 0.5, the application of ordinary least-squares 
can be justified except where there is some clear evidence 
of a non-constant disturbance variance.
The assumption that E(e^e+) =0, s f tA s ~c
When this assumption is violated, we have what is known
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as autocorrelation. The application of ordinary least-squares 
in the presence of autocorrelation will produce inefficient 
predictions .^
The problem can be dealt with by applying generalized 
least-squares. Three changes must be made to model (3.12).
The variance-covariance matrix of e is still assumed to be 
positive definite and known a priori, but is no longer 
assumed to be diagonal. Secondly, it cannot be assumed that 
eg  ^ is independent of and therefore the distrib-
ution of (PSq jj-PSq ^) becomes very difficult to derive. For
this reason, in the presence of autocorrelation it is simpl-
/\
est to use the point estimator (PSq ^-0.5) as a measure of 
bias in favour of the party under consideration. Finally,
o oJ. Johnston shows that if:
(3.24) E( e^le0.5') 
E ^ e2e0.5^
- E(ese0.5) -
the best unbiased linear predictor of PSq  ^ is given by:
(3.25)
~  ~  ~  2 ~  ~
P 0 5 = x q 5 3 +a (a fl) (y-Xß )
In the absence of autocorrelation, a is a vector of zeros
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and (3.25) is equivalent to (3.16).
A number of statistical tests for autocorrelation are
in popular use. Perhaps the most common uses the Durbin-
39Watson statistic:
(3.26) d = [ Z (et-et_1)2]/Ee2
t=2 t
A
where e. = PS,-x'$, x ' = {1 OV,}t t t . t t
The calculated value of this statistic can be used to test a 
null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation against an alternat­
ive hypothesis of positive first-order autocorrelation.
The assumption that the OV_^s are fixed numbers
For the present analysis this amounts to an assumption 
that the OV s are measured without error. In closely contest-
L/
ed seats, with scrutineers from all parties monitoring the 
count carefully, measurement errors are likely to be neglig- 
able. In the safer seats, however, it is reasonable to 
presume that errors in the count will be more prevalent, 
since the chance of their being decisive is less.^ However, 
the errors are unlikely to favour the same party in every 
seat; some will cancel each other out, and in practice the 
net effect which they will have upon the overall vote for a 
party can safely be ignored. As a numerical example, consider 
the 1980 Australian general election. There were 8,305,633 
formal votes cast,^ so an error of 0.001 in the proportion
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of the vote attributed to a party corresponds to a net mis- 
aliocation of 8,306 votes. This figure seems implausibly 
high.
The problem becomes more significant, however, in 
analyses which attempt to use an estimated two-party pref­
erred vote, rather than a first preference vote, as the 
predictor variable. The construction of two-party preferred 
votes typically involves an extrapolation from observed 
preference distributions. But as Rydon points out,^  the 
seats in which preferences are distributed do not constitute 
a random sample from the total set of seats, and for this 
reason uncertainty surrounding notional preference allocat­
ions is not susceptible to probabilistic quantification.
The solution to this problem lies not in the area of 
statistical technique, but in the interpretation which is 
placed on the predictor variables in use. Regressions on 
estimated two-party preferred votes simply cannot be treated 
as equivalent to regressions on actual two-party preferred 
votes (knowledge of which requires at least a full distrib­
ution of preferences in every seat). A crude index of the 
plausibility of estimates is simply the number of votes which 
must be notionally allocated. When this is low, the problem 
is less troublesome than when it is high. But this still 
leaves the two-party preferred vote in limbo. It must be 
emphasised, however, that the problem arises in the lack of 
hard data available to the analyst, rather than in the 
statistical techniques used to investigate them; the solution 
of the problem is in the hands of the Electoral Offices.
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The assumption that the fitted model is valid for the 
specified value of 5
This assumption is of crucial importance; if it is not 
satisfied, the derived prediction distributions will be in­
valid .
In practice there are two distinct cases in which the 
assumption cannot be defended. The first, foreshadowed in the 
analysis of assumption (2), arises when an extrapolation to 
a value of OV far from OV is attempted. A good example of 
such a case would be an attempt to predict the proportion of 
seats which the Democratic Labor Party would win with 50% of 
the first preferences, on the basis of regressions of DLP 
seat proportions on DLP vote proportions at post-war Austral­
ian general elections. Since the DLP at all those elections 
was below the so-called "threshold of representation", the
A A
ordinary least-squares estimators $q and ß^  are equal to
/N
zero, and therefore PSq  ^ is also equal to zero. Such a 
prediction is clearly absurd.
The problem is essentially the same as that noted in 
Chapter Two. Large extrapolations again implicitly postulate 
political circumstances which differ radically from those 
which actually prevailed, in a way which is inherently un­
knowable. It is not possible to specify those circumstances 
in which a prediction will be tenable; this depends very much 
on the precise data points available to the analyst in each 
case. But it seems reasonable to suggest that extrapolations 
to values of OV outside the observed range of values of 0V+ 
should be treated with caution. In practice this means that
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while it is possible validly to compare the positions of two 
"major” parties (such as the ALP and the Liberals), or two 
"minor" parties (such as the NCP and the Australian Demo­
crats) , it is not possible validly to compare the positions 
of a "major" and a "minor" party. Finally, it is worth 
emphasising that the foregoing argument is not related to 
the fact that the prediction variance of PS^ increases as 6 
diverges from OV.
The second case in which the assumption is untenable 
arises when inappropriate data points have been included in 
the estimation procedure. To obtain data points, we must 
reach into the past for election results. How far into the 
past we should reach is by no means clear. Tufte, for example, 
conducts three regressions using seats-votes data for the 
U.S. House of Representatives, one for the period 1868-1970, 
one for the period 1900-1970, and one for the period 1948- 
1970. (The best fit, oddly enough, is given by the second). 
However, he notes that "The party biases computed... result 
from gerrymandering, differential turnout across districts, 
and the different population sizes of electoral districts".^  
All of these postulated causes of bias are likely to vary 
over time, producing a change over time in the underlying 
regression coefficients. The inclusion in the analysis of 
data points associated with a seats-votes relationship which 
has long been superseded will thus lead to invalid predict­
ions .
Once again, it is not possible to specify a priori the 
circumstances in which a data point should be excluded; this
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decision must be made on the basis of the relationships 
revealed in the regression analysis. It might be thought 
desirable to divide the data on the basis of the occurrence 
of electoral redistributions. However, the increasing frequ­
ency of such redistributions in many polities makes such an 
approach undesirable. At least three data points are required
for a sensible analysis to be conducted, since with less than
~2 - ' "three data points, c = 0. It is also quite possible that
redistributions could leave the seats-votes relationship 
unaffected, in which case to include data from only one 
redistribution period could cause a needless loss of predict­
ion precision.
V
Before we look at an example of the use of the techniques 
developed in this chapter, it is worth noting that OV has
Is
been defined as the proportion of the overall vote polled by 
the party under consideration. Under the plurality system of 
scrutiny this is clear in meaning, but under preferential 
voting it is somewhat ambiguous, since it could refer to the 
proportion of first preferences polled by the party, to the 
proportion of the overall vote gained by the party after the 
distribution of preferences in those seats in which it proves 
necessary, or to an estimated proportion of the two-party 
preferred vote. A choice between these possible predictor 
variables must clearly be made, and it will depend on the aim 
of the investigation. A comparison of the positions of two 
"minor” parties must obviously be based on either the first
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or the second; a comparison of the positions of two "major” 
parties could be based on any one of the three, though the 
second and third take better account of the fact that under 
the full preferential system a vote cannot be unambiguously 
"for" any one party.
The following example uses as data points estimated two 
party preferred vote proportions gained by the Liberal- 
Country Party coalition at Australian House of Representat­
ives in the period from 1946 to 1980, together with the 
relevant seat proportions.^ The 1943 election is a natural 
cutoff point, since it marked the breakdown of the party 
system which had essentially prevailed since 1931, while the 
1946 election saw the emergence of the party system which 
essentially still prevails. The following table sets out 
the data used:
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Table (3.1)
Year 0V+ - LCP share of 
two-party vote
PS - LCP share 
of seats
1946 .4613 .3919
1949 .5140 .6116
1951 .5081 .5702
1954 .4905 .5289
1955 .5380 .6148
1958 .5412 .6311
1961 .4947 .5082
1963 .5261 .5902
1966 .5695 .6639
1969 .4983 .5280
1972 .4733 .4640
1974 .4834 .4803
1975 .5572 .7165
1977 .5462 .6935
1980 .5041 .5920
A fit is first attempted using ordinary least-squares.
The following equation is derived, together with its co-
2efficient of determination (R ) and standard 
regression coefficients:^^
errors of
(3.27) PSt = 2.660(OV )-0.7940 
(.2579) (.1327)
R2 = .8911
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?The high value of R“ indicates that the estimated relation­
ship fits the data well, in fact better than most of those 
estimated by Tufte, and supports the proposition that all 
the data points are associated with the same underlying 
model structure. The regression coefficients are both highly 
statistically significant; even at a significance level of 
0.005 the hypothesis of the absence of bias must be rejected 
The value of the Durbin-Watson statistic is 1.243. At 
the 0.05 level of significance the test is inconclusive, but 
at the 0.01 level the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation 
can be accepted.
The estimated residual variance is given by: 
a2 = 0.0009391
and the value of the g statistic given in expression (3.8) 
for 6 = 0.5 is therefore:
g = -1.1304
Using the tables of the t distribution provided by Yule and 
Kendall, this leads to the conclusion that with an even 
division of the two-party preferred vote the probability of 
an LCP win is 0.854, and the probability of an ALP win is 
0.146.
If the generalized least-squares estimators are used, 
with specified as in (3.23), the estimated equation is:
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(3.28) PS = 2.658 (OV^) -0.7931 R2 = .8910
(.2578) (.1327)
This is practically the same as that obtained using ordinary 
least-squares, and the derived probability of an LCP win 
with an even division of the vote is the same, 0.854. This 
means that with an even division of the vote the LCP has 5.8 
times the ALP's chance of winning a legislative majority., - - 
This figure may appear to differ substantially from that 
obtained using the methods proposed in Chapter Two, but to a 
certain extent this appearance is produced by the convention 
of expressing bias as a dimensionless ratio of two probabil­
ities. When the two probabilities of an LCP win, 0.983 and 
0.854 are compared, the difference is not so striking.
It arises because different data are used in their 
calculation. Neither measure is unequivocally superior to the 
other; the analyst must choose between them on the basis of 
the data available, and the extent to which their different 
underlying assumptions are satisfied in the case under con­
sideration. It is notable that both measures provide evidence 
of a substantial handicap imposed upon the Australian Labor 
Party.
The main point of this example, once again, is simply to 
show that the techniques developed in this chapter are feas­
ible and practically useful. In fact, the two-variable linear 
model is available in almost all of the popular computer 
statistical packages, and the calculations in this example 
were in fact initially performed on a pocket calculator, and
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were subsequently checked against a GLIM program. Once again, 
computer technology serves to make apparently complex calcul­
ations almost trivially simple.
VI
The foregoing analysis can be summarized in point form:
(1) The two-variable linear regression model can be used to 
produce logically acceptable measures of bias.
(2) The assumption of a linear relationship between E(PS^ _) 
and OV can be empirically justified, and has the virtue
~U
of simplicity.
(3) The assumption that e is normally distributed follows
V
logically from highly plausible postulates.
2 2(4) The assumptions that E(e ) = 0, that E(e ) = a , and
X' ~c
that E(e e ) = 0, s f t, can be relaxed without seriously s r
affecting the viability of the analysis, since general­
ized least-squares can be applied.
(5) Problems with measurement errors only arise when two- 
party preferred vote estimates are used in the analysis.
(6) Attempts to extrapolate the inferred relationship to 
values of OV outside the observed range of 0V^ _s must be 
treated with great caution. In particular, extrapolations
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to values well outside that range are simply not viable.
(7) The regression model, when used with care, is a useful 
and valuable tool for the electoral analyst.
(144)
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Chapter Four - Miscellaneous Approaches
I
In this chapter consideration is given to two articles 
which do not clearly follow the lines of analysis developed 
in either of the last two chapters. The first is Hinich, 
Mickelsen and Ordeshook's examination of the U.S. President­
ial Electoral College.'*' The second is Quandt's stochastic
2model of two-party elections. These approaches are consid­
ered in a separate chapter partly because although they 
model the seats-votes relationship probabilistically they 
do not directly propose empirically based measures of bias, 
and partly because such an organization of the argument 
facilitates the process of contrasting them with the models 
proposed in earlier chapters.
A description of the techniques used in each article is 
given, and their utility is compared with the techniques 
developed in Chapter Two. It is argued that measures of bias 
can be derived from the models put forward by Hinich et al 
and by Quandt; that such measures are no more soundly empir­
ically based than those proposed in Chapter Two; that such 
measures involve much more complicated and difficult calcul­
ations than those proposed in Chapter Two; and that the 
models considered in this chapter therefore do not constitute 
a distinctively useful line of inquiry.
II
Hinich, Mickelsen and Ordeshook address a number of
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different issues in their paper, but for our purposes its
most important aspect is its attempt to calculate, given
certain assumptions, the probability of a reversal, that is,
the probability that a candidate in a two-party contest with
a minority of the overall popular vote will win a majority
of the votes in the electoral college.
Their model assumes n (=50) constituencies, identical
in terms of the number of formal votes cast, and in terms" of
the probability distribution of the proportion of the vote
polled by (let us say) the governing party. The latter they
3assume to be a two-parameter beta density:
(4.1) f (vp = { [r («)+<)>)] / [r(u)r(<(>)] }v“'1(i-vi)<,>'1
The proportions of the vote polled by the governing party in
different seats are assumed to be stochastically independent
Hinich et al prove that the expected value and variance
of this beta distribution together determine the values of
the parameters w and (j>, and that since the constituencies
are assumed to be identical, the expected value and variance
of the overall vote uniquely determine the distribution of
the governing party's share of the vote in each seat. The
variance of the overall vote is assumed to be related to its
4expected value by the expression:
(4.2) Var(OV) = (o/n) [l-E(OV)]2
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where o is an arbitrarily chosen constant.
The remainder of the analysis is concerned with calcul­
ating the probability of a reversal for given values of E(OV)
5and c. This is done by defining an indicator variable:
(4.3) I  ^ = 0 if and only if 0 4 V; < 0.5
= 1 if and only if 0.5 < < 1
It is pointed out that:
(4.4)
(4.5)
and
(4.6)
E(Ir d  “ ' 5f < V  dVi " Pi 
Var(Iri) = Pi(l-Pf) =
Cov(V.. Ir .) - / V.f(V.) dV. - E(V.)E(Ir .)
= pi [Var(Vi)Var(Iri)]%
A reversal is characterized by the event:
(4.7) (OV>0.5 and IIri/n<0.5)
i
or (OV<0.5 and ZIr^./n>0.5)
i
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If:
(4.8) Zov = [OV-E(OV)]/[Var(OV)]%
a = [0.5-E(OV)]/[Var(OV)]%
ZI = [qiri/n)-P;]/(Piqi/n)%
£
b = (0.5-pi)/(piqi/n)^
the probability of a reversal can be written as:
(4.9) P (reversal) = P(Z^^>a and Z^ .<b)
4- P(Z^^<a and Z-j.>b)
This is calculated by assuming that n is sufficiently large 
to ensure that the distribution of:
z = Z0V
approximates well to the bivariate normal:
1 p '
^  1
(4.10) z v N{0, }
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The actual probabilities in (4.9) are calculated using Monte 
/:Carlo methods. It should be noted that when E(OV) = 0.5, 
in the absence of bias the two probabilities which sum to 
the probability of a reversal in (4.9) will be equal, and 
their difference or ratio can therefore be used as a measure 
of bias.
The model differs from that put forward in Chapter Two 
in three main ways:
(1) The proportion of the vote polled in each seat by the 
governing party is assumed to have a beta, rather than 
a normal, distribution. Hinich, Mickelsen and Ordeshook 
justify this specification by reference to the general­
ity of the beta distribution, and to the fact that under 
such a distributional assumption the variable can 
only take a value between zero and one. It has already . 
been pointed out, however, that this property is of 
theoretical rather than practical importance. The argu­
ments put forward in Chapter Two in support of the 
specification of normality need not be repeated here. It 
is merely necessary to note that the adoption of the 
specification of normality does not affect the remaining 
aspects of the model in any way.
(2) In the model put forward by Hinich et al, the proportion 
of the vote polled by the governing party is assumed to 
be identically distributed in every seat, and the num­
bers of formal votes cast in each seat are also assumed
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to be identical. These assumptions are patently unreal­
istic, but they can be relaxed. They are adopted in 
order to create a situation in which the expected value 
and variance of the overall vote for the governing 
party determine the distribution of that party's vote 
in each seat. Such a situation, however, also exists 
when the simulation techniques developed in Section VII 
of Chapter Two are applied, and those simulation tech­
niques can therefore be grafted onto the model currently 
under examination. If the expected value of the overall 
vote to be produced by the simulation is equal to ip, 
expression (2.33) must be replaced by:
• U > d =
and expression (2.36) must be altered accordingly. The 
defects of these simulation techniques, noted in Chapter 
Two, remain. It is important to realize, however, that 
those defects are also present in the model as origin­
ally proposed by Hinich et al. The assumption of an 
identical distribution of the vote in all constituencies 
is an arbitrary one, and lacks empirical support. Simu­
lations conducted along the lines proposed in Chapter 
Two also have their arbitrary elements, but they are 
much more empirically sound and realistic than those 
based on an assumption of perfect political homogeneity.
The relaxation of the assumption of identical
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constituencies makes necessary some changes to express­
ions given earlier in this chapter. The subscripted 
quantities p^, and are no longer assumed to be 
the same for all i ; in (4.8) the expressions for and 
b become:
(4.12) Zx = [(Il^/n) - (Ep^n)] / ( I p ^ / n 2)^
i d • i
b =  [0.5-(Zpi/n)]/(Spiq^/n2)^ 
i i
The covariance of OV and El^/n is given by:2
(4.13) Cov(OV, Il^/n) = (1/n) Z r X o v ( V ^  , 1^)
i i
= (l/n)ErK pi [Var(Vi)Var(Iri)]
i
As a consequence, the distribution of z is given by:
(4.14) z v N{0,
1 X 
X 1
}
where A = [Cov(OV, £Iri/n)]/[Var(OV)Var(EIri/n)]% 
i i
(3) Hinich., Mickelsen and Ordeshook calculate the probabil­
ity of a reversal. In contrast, the measure of bias 
proposed in Chapter Two is the ratio of the probability
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of a government majority to that of a government minor­
ity with E(OV) = 0.5, that is:
(4.15) P(ZI>b)/P(ZI<b)
Now to obtain this ratio it is only necessary to inte­
grate the univariate marginal density of El ^/n, and
i
this is a vastly more simple task than the multiplegintegration of a bivariate density. Indeed, the mere 
specification of (4.14) requires n numerical integrat­
ions to calculate the value of Cov(V^, I for all i. 
Even when this is accomplished, the task of numerically 
integrating the density implied by (4.14) remains.
It can thus be seen that when framed with realistic assumpt­
ions the model proposed by Hinich et al becomes inordinately 
difficult to work with. In contrast, the model of Chapter Two 
is very simple to apply, and gives rise to measures of bias 
which have a clear and obvious meaning. None of the pitfalls 
associated with that model is avoided in the formulation 
originally provided by Hinich et al. For these reasons, the 
model of Chapter Two provides a more useful way of approach­
ing the problem of measuring bias.
Ill
The aim of Quandt's analysis is to discover some assump­
tions about the probability distributions of one party's 
proportion of the vote in each seat which imply swing ratios
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of between two and four, and the presence of bias (as defined
9by Quandt). In pursuit of this aim, he sets out one general 
model, and a number of specific ones.
The general model assumes a "large" number of constit­
uencies in which equal numbers of formal votes are cast;^ 
the probability of a win by the government in the ith 
constituency is given by:
1
(4.16) / f (V I 0 ) dV
0.5
where the parameter 0^, is a scalar random variable, identic­
ally distributed in all constituencies. On the basis of these 
assumptions Quandt derives expressions for the expected 
proportions of the overall vote and total seats won by the 
government, and deduces necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the absence of bias.
The main specific model assumes that is uniformly 
distributed between the limits 0 and 0+t (with t an arbit­
rarily specified constant), and that the quantity v = 0/(1-t) 
has a beta distribution. Values of the swing ratio and bias 
are obtained by postulating various values for t and the 
parameters of the distribution of v.
Quandt concedes that the assumption of a uniform condit­
ional distribution of is not a very realistic one, and 
proposes as an alternative that f(V^) be regarded as a normal- 
normal mixture. Under such a specification, however, bias 
cannot exist, so for our purposes this is not very helpful.
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A more promising approach, not pursued by Quandt, is to
2treat as normal with mean 6 and variance a , 0 being a 
random variable distributed according to some function of 
the beta distribution. Such an approach implies the possibil­
ity of the existence of bias.
Quandt models changes in the electoral support for the 
government in two different ways. The first, already noted, 
involves postulating changes in the parameters of the dist­
ribution of v. The second involves the assumption of a swing 
pattern similar to that assumed by Theil in his analysis of 
the "cube law". It was pointed out in Chapter One that 
Theil's assumption is of dubious validity, and this seriously 
limits the applicability of this aspect of Quandt's work; 
for this reason it need not be considered further.
When compared with the model of Chapter Two, the most 
distinctive feature of Quandt's model is the way in which the 
distributions of the V^ .s are specified. In Quandt's model, 
this is achieved by the mathematical procedure of randomiz­
ation, while in the model of Chapter Two, the specifications 
are based on the relative government majorities in each seat 
at the election preceding the one under examination.
If the expressions derived by Quandt are to be used to 
measure bias, the parameters of the distribution of 0 must 
be chosen so as to produce a pattern of the distributions of 
the V^ ,s similar to that which might have prevailed with an 
expected even division of the overall vote. This, however, is 
merely a circuitous way of achieving the same result as was 
achieved more easily using the model of Chapter Two. For this
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reason Quandt’s model does not lead to distinctively useful 
measures of bias. This is not a fault in Quandt's work; it 
is rather a reflection of the fact that he is in the main 
concerned with problems slightly different to those with 
which this thesis has been preoccupied.
IV
The arguments of this chapter can now be reiterated 
briefly in point form:
(1) Measures of bias can be derived from the models of 
seats-votes relationships put forward by Hinich, 
Mickelsen and Ordeshook, and by Quandt.
(2) If realistic assumptions are incorporated in the model 
of Hinich et al, it becomes much more complex than the 
approach of Chapter Two, while avoiding none of the 
pitfalls of that approach.
(3) Measures of bias based on Quandt's model merely duplic­
ate the procedures of Chapter Two in a circuitous 
fashion.
For these reasons, the models examined in this chapter 
do not constitute a fruitful way of attacking the prob­
lem of the measurement of bias.
(4)
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Systems", p 315-6, defines bias as the extent to which 
the expected proportion of seats won by a party exceeds 
0.5 when its expected proportion of the vote is 0.5. 
This is the same as the first measure of bias discussed 
in Section V of Chapter Two.
By "large", Quandt means large enough to allow the 
subsequent analysis to be based on integration rather
than summation.
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Chapter Five - Conclusions
The time has come to summarize the arguments put forward 
in this thesis, and to reiterate their significance for the 
analysis of elections based on the system of single-member 
constituencies.
The starting point of the investigation is the definit­
ion of "bias” as the extent to which the relationship between 
seats and votes differs from party to party . This formulation 
is clear, places due emphasis on the role played by political 
parties in liberal democracies, and captures the essence of 
a problem which has attracted the attention of a significant 
number of scholars.
Some typical works of those scholars are then examined 
in detail, and it is shown that their analyses are based on 
a serious misunderstanding of the nature of the relationship 
between seats and votes, in that they treat the proportion 
of seats won by a party with a given proportion of the vote, 
and the proportion of the vote which a party needs to give 
it a specified proportion of the seats, as uniquely deter­
mined quantities, whereas in fact they are random variables. 
An examination of the models put forward by Gudgin and Taylor 
demonstrates that they err in their belief that the proport­
ion of the seats won by a party consists of two components, 
one deterministic, a function purely of the proportion of 
the vote won by that party, and the other stochastic, reflec­
ting the spatial distribution of that party's vote. As a 
corollary of this, the measure of bias proposed by Soper and
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Rydon is shown to be defective. Finally, the work of Butler 
is considered, and it is pointed out that his measure of 
bias is based on the empirical proposition that in the event 
of a non-uniform swing from one party to another, seats will 
change hands to the same extent as if the swing had been 
uniform. This assumption is tested and found to be signif­
icantly at odds with reality in a number of cases.
These arguments taken together establish the existence 
of a serious problem for students of elections, which can be 
stated briefly. Measures of bias based on the assumption of 
a deterministic seats-votes relationship are meaningless in 
the context of, and inapplicable to, stochastic seats-votes 
relationships, because under the latter, bias takes the form 
of differences in the chances which different parties have 
of winning a certain proportion of the seats with a given 
proportion of the vote. This thesis is the first analysis to 
identify this problem explicitly, and examine ways in which 
it can be overcome. As a consequence of the characterization 
of the seats-votes relationship as stochastic, it is argued 
that the methods of probability theory and mathematical stat­
istics must be used to measure bias. The remainder of the 
thesis consists of a rigorous exposition and analysis of a 
number of ways in which probability theory can be so applied.
In Chapter Two, it is shown that the assumption that the 
proportions of the vote polled by a party in each seat are 
independent random variables leads to the conclusion that the 
proportion of seats in the legislature won by that party is 
also a random variable. This fact forms the foundation for
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the development of a measure of bias. It is argued, on the 
basis of a straightforward modification of the defective 
measure of bias proposed by Butler, that a politically rele­
vant and easily interpreted measure of the extent to which 
the seats-votes relationship varies from party to party is 
the ratio of the probability of a government majority to the 
probability of an opposition majority when there is an expec­
ted even division of the vote.
The calculation of these probabilities requires a spec­
ification of the probability distributions of the government's 
proportion of the vote in each seat which will produce an 
expected even division of the overall vote. It is argued 
that these distributions can safely be assumed to be normal. 
The specification of their parameters, however, is a rather 
more difficult process, because it involves simulating, on 
some sort of empirical basis, an event which simply did not 
occur at the election under consideration. For this reason 
the parameters of the simulated distributions cannot be 
inferred (in the technical sense) from observations. The 
procedure ultimately proposed involves making the necessary 
simulations by uniformly adjusting location parameters in­
ferred from the observed voting pattern at the election under 
consideration, to the extent necessary to produce an expected 
even division of the overall vote. An implication of this 
line of analysis is that there can be no single "correct" 
bias figure, since there exist no underlying "true" distrib­
utions to which the simulated distributions can correspond.
In evaluating the simulations the criterion of correctness
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must be replaced by the criterion of plausibility. It is 
pointed out that this is an inevitable consequence of the 
nature of the problem; insofar as it constitutes a defect in 
the measure proposed, this defect is present to a greater 
extent in the deterministic measure of bias proposed by 
Brookes, which is based on the simulated distributions being 
degenerate. Finally on this point, it is noted that the 
plausibility of the simulations will be low when they involve 
large adjustments to the inferred parameters, since such 
adjustments implicitly postulate political circumstances 
which differ radically from those which actually prevailed, 
in a manner which is inherently unknowable. It follows that 
the procedures developed in Chapter Two cannot be mechanic­
ally applied to any election at all, but are limited in their 
usefulness to the analysis of elections at which the overall 
vote is fairly evenly divided among the parties. This fact 
again is a consequence of the nature of the problem rather 
than a defect in its solution, and its recognition marks a 
significant advance on the previous literature. The chapter 
concludes with a demonstration that the techniques developed 
therein can be applied in a multi-party situation.
The measure developed in Chapter Two is clearly of value 
to political scientists. Within the constraints imposed by 
the nature of the problem it is logically rigorous. It is 
based on the recognition that bias is a by-product of differ­
ences in the propensities of constituencies, and ultimately 
voters, to support a given party; and is explicitly calcul­
ated using indicators of those differences. It is
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comparatively simple to compute, and its meaning is clear 
and intuitively appealing. For these reasons it can be reg­
arded as adequate for use in empirical electoral analysis.
The third chapter expounds in great detail the applic­
ation of the general linear regression model to the analysis 
of the seats-votes relationship. In that model the proportion 
of seats won with a given proportion of the overall vote is 
assumed to be a random variable; this fact is not deduced 
from other assumptions. It is shown that a measure of bias 
essentially the same in meaning (though not in value) as 
that derived in Chapter Two can be developed from the two- 
variable linear model. Recognition is given to the fact that 
in some cases the empirical assumptions underlying the use 
of ordinary least-squares estimators may be violated, 
necessitating the use of generalized least-squares estimators. 
The major non-obvious conclusion reached in the chapter is 
that once again the measure derived will only be highly 
plausible and reliable when the prediction distributions 
involved in its calculation are conditional upon values of 
the predictor variable reasonably close to those observed in 
the data. As a consequence, valid comparisons of the posit­
ions of "major" and "minor" parties cannot be conducted. It 
is noted that this is yet again a result of the nature of 
the problem being tackled. This point has not been previous­
ly recognized in the literature.
It is necessary to note that neither of the measures 
developed in Chapters Two and Three is intrinsically superior 
to the other, but one may be more useful than the other in a
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given situation. For example, elections in a polity marked 
by frequent large scale electoral redistributions, or rapid 
demographic change, are more susceptible to analysis using 
the techniques developed in Chapter Two, since such factors 
can call into question the principles of prediction assoc­
iated with the regression model. On the other hand, the 
regression model is much simpler to apply to situations in 
which a significant number of parties obtain roughly equi­
valent shares of the vote. This emphasises further that bias 
is not something which can be measured in a mechanical way; 
the investigator must proceed with discretion, and pay due 
attention to the assumptions underlying the techniques used.
The fourth chapter deals with two significant analyses 
which, while approaching the seats-votes relationship probab­
ilistically, do not directly propose the empirical calcul­
ation of measures of bias. It is shown that measures of bias 
can be derived from those analyses, but that the measures so 
derived are much more complex and difficult to compute than 
those proposed in Chapter Two, while suffering from the same 
limitations. For this reason they cannot be recommended for 
practical use.
We shall end where we began, by contemplating the con­
flicting assertions from Middleton and Butler set out on page 
(1). This thesis has shown that neither statement is correct. 
An electoral system based on single-member constituencies is 
a gamble - but it is not the greatest gamble on earth. The 
latter description must be reserved for situations in which 
the participant is in total ignorance of the probabilities of
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success or failure; and the techniques developed in this 
thesis allow such ignorance to be partially but significantly 
dispelled in the field of electoral analysis.
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Appendix I
The following computer program is used to calculate the 
values of E(EI^) set out in Table (2.1). It is written in 
the GLIM statistical language, as implemented on the 
Australian National University UNIVAC 1100/82 general purpose 
computer. For a detailed description of this language, see 
R.J. Baker and J.A. Neider, The GLIM System (Release 3)
Manual, Numerical Algorithms Group and the Royal Statistical 
Society, Oxford, 1977.
The B^ .s used as data in the calculation of Table (2.1) 
are contained in the file entitled DATA, which is added to 
the runstream at the fourth line of the program.
In the program, 70S represents the value of a, 7>U 
represents the value of y, and 7>E represents the calculated
value of E(£Ir .^).
I
@FTNLIB*GLIM.GLIM ,,/21 
$ECH0
$ACCURACY 3
$UNITS 125 $DATA B $READ 
@ADD DATA 
$MACRO E
$CALC 7oE=7oNU-(7oCU(7oNP((0.5+7oU-B)/7oS))) $L00K 7>E $ 
$END
$MACRO A
$CALC 7oS=0.01 $USE E $
$CALC 7oS=0.02 $USE E $
$CALC 7oS=0.03 $USE E $
$CALC 7oS=0.04 $USE E $
$CALC 7oS=0.05 $USE E $
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$END
$CALC 7oU=-0.05 $USE A $ 
$CALC 7oU=-0.04 $USE A $ 
$CALC 7oU=-0.03 $USE A $ 
$CALC 7>U=-0.02 $USE A $ 
$CALC 7oU=-0.01 $USE A $ 
$CALC 7oU=0 $USE A $ 
$CALC 7oU=0.01 $USE A $ 
$CALC 7oU=0.02 $USE A $ 
$CALC 7oU=0.03 $USE A $ 
$CALC 7oU=0.04 $USE A $ 
$CALC 7oU=0.05 $USE A $ 
$END 
$STOP
Each instruction $USE A $ produces one row of values of
E(£Iri) in Table (2.1).
£
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Appendix II
The following computer program is used to calculate the
values of P(EI £=y), (actual), set out in Table (2.2). It is 
i
written in the REDUCE 2 algebraic manipulation language, as 
implemented on the Australian National University UNIVAC 
1100/82 general purpose computer. For a description of this 
language, see A.C. Hearn, REDUCE 2 User’s Manual, University 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, 1973.
This program requires that the individual probabilities 
of a win by the government in the various seats be placed in 
the array A( ). The elements of this array, numbered from 0 
to 124, must be specified one by one. To conserve space 
only A(0), A(l) and A(124) are explicitly set out in this 
program. The values to which the elements of A( ) are set 
are obtained from the output of the program set out in 
Appendix III.
@E8*REDUCE2.REDUCE 
ON ECH0$
ON LIST$
ON FLOAT$
OFF ALLFAC$
ARRAY A(124)$
A(0) : = 0.0017$
A (1) := 0.4073$
[insert here values of A(2)...A(123)[
A(124) := 0.2308$
K := FOR I := 0 : 124 PRODUCT (A(I)*Z - A(I) + 1)$
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WRITE K$
QUIT$
This program produces the power series expansion of the 
probability generating function of the generalized binomial 
distribution defined by the particular set of probabilities 
placed in the array A( ) .
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Appendix III
The following computer program, written in the GLIM
language, is used to calculate the statistics set out in
Section VIII, Chapter Two, pp 89-90. Three distinct sets of
data, contained in the file THESIS.DATA4, are used in their
calculation. The vectors X and Y contain respectively
Mackerras’s estimates of the actual numbers of votes gained,
on a two-party basis, by the ALP and LCP in each seat at the
1980 Australian general election. The vector J contains
his estimates of the percentage swings to the ALP in each
seat at that election.
2The quantity o .* is represented by 7oV; the quantity
Zr is represented by 7oA; the vector P contains the
i
simulated probability of a win by the LCP in each of the 125
seats; the mean of the generalized binomial distribution,
Ep^ , is represented by 7>X; its variance, Ep^ .q^ ., is represent 
i i
ed by 7>Y; the Esseen bound, 0.7975L^, is represented by 7>E.
@FTNLIB*GLIM.GLIM ,,/21 
$ECH0
$UNITS 125 $DATA X Y J $READ 
@ADD THESIS.DATA4 
$ACCURACY 12 
$CALC 7oT=7oCU(X)+7oCU(Y) 
$ACCURACY 4
$CALC S = J /1 0 0  : 7oM=7oCU(S) / 1 2 5
$CALC 7oS=(7oCU((S-7oM)**2))/124
$CALC 7oV=7oS*(126/125)
$L00K 7oV $
$CALC R= (X+Y) /7>T
$CALC T=X+Y : B=(Y/ T) +S  
$CALC %A=%CU(R*B)
$LOOK YoA $
$CALC P=l-7oNP ( (YoA-B) /Y.SQRT (7.V) )
$LOOK P $
$CALC YoX=YoCU (P ) : %Y=%CU (P* (1 - P )  )
$LOOK YoX : YoY $
$CALC YoB= (YoCU (P -  (3 *  (P * * 2 ) ) +  (4 *  (P * * 3 ) ) - (2 *  ( P * * 4 ) ) ) )  
$CALC %C=%SQRT(7.Y**3)
$CALC YoD=YoB/YoC 
$CALC YoE=YoD*0.7 9 7 5  
$LOOK YoE $
$STOP
(177)
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